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SURVEYS
ENTERTAINMENT LAW IN THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
NATIONAL SPORTS LAW INSTITUTE
OF MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Volume 15, Number 2, the spring 2005 issue of the Marquette
Sports Law Review, and with the support of the Sports & Entertainment Law
Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin, the National Sports Law Institute
published a special report on Sports Law in the State of Wisconsin.' As the
Section is devoted to two distinct areas of law, the Section also supported the
research and development of this second report on Entertainment Law in the
State of Wisconsin.
Entertainment and the law have intersected in many different ways in
Wisconsin, where litigation within the entertainment industry has involved a
variety of areas of law, from intellectual property to constitutional law. The
purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of the development of
entertainment law in the state of Wisconsin until the end of the year 2006.
With the support of the Sports & Entertainment Law Section of the State Bar
of Wisconsin, the Institute began to compile the cases and statutes that make
* This report was developed and drafted under the supervision of Professor Paul Anderson,
Associate Director of the National Sports Law Institute, faculty advisor to the Marquette Sports Law
Review and Chair of the Sports & Entertainment Law Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin.
Marquette University Law School student Jay Smith (L'07), a 2006-2007 NSLI research
assistant drafted the initial report with the editorial assistance of Judy Massuda (L'07), Lindsay
Potrafke (L'07), and Megan Ryther (L'07). Research and writing of various parts of the report and
early drafts of sections within the report were prepared by several current and former students
including: Katie Featherston (L'06), Associate Attorney, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, WI; Justin
Leinwand (L'07), Judy Massuda (L'07), Megan Ryther (L'07), and Jay Smith (L'07). In addition,
Attorney Beth Russell, of Russell Law in Madison, Wisconsin provided the initial guidance that set
the framework for the report.
Thank you to the Sports & Entertainment Law Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin, which
provided financial support for the production of this Report.
1. Nat'l Sports Law Institute of Marquette Univ. Law School, Survey: Sports Law in the State of
Wisconsin, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 425 (2005).
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up this report in 2005.2 The focus of the report is on the rich history of case
and statutory law in Wisconsin focusing on legal issues in the entertainment
industry. For ease of understanding, the cases included are separated into
distinct areas of the entertainment industry. Within each area of the
entertainment industry, the cases are then broken up by the area of law
addressed in each case. The areas of entertainment covered include: (1) film,
(2) television, (3) music, (4) radio, (5) art, publishing, and performance, (6)
entertainment facilities, and (7) new technologies (computer/internet). Within
each of these industry segments the cases are arranged in chronological order
This survey is a starting point for practitioners undertaking the practice of
entertainment law in the state of Wisconsin. It is also intended to provide an
in depth look at how the law has impacted the entertainment industry in the
state of Wisconsin.
II. FILM
Wisconsin is not known for its film production; however, there have been
numerous cases within the film industry. These disputes have primarily dealt
with three areas of law: constitutional law, intellectual property law, and
antitrust law.
1. Constitutional Law
Constitutional law is an area that significantly affects the film industry,
from owners and operators of video stores and motion picture production
companies, to local school systems. First Amendment protection for business
owners and students must be balanced with policies established by local
ordinances, state statutes, and school boards. In these disputes, one party is
usually prohibited from operating its business in a certain way, while the other
party is attempting to enforce state or local regulations.
Nat'l Ass 'n of Theatre Owners v. Motion Picture Comm 'n3
NATO, Marcus Theatres Management Corporation, U.A. Theatres of
Wisconsin, RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, and Milwaukee Towne
Corporation moved for declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction to
prevent the enforcement of a Milwaukee ordinance that empowered the
2. The research conducted for this report is as comprehensive as possible. However, practitioners
should not substitute the research and reporting conducted herein for their own research of cases and
statutes in any particular situation.
3. 328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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Milwaukee Motion Picture Commission. The ordinance would not permit
anyone from showing a motion picture to the public without first applying to
the Motion Picture Commission for classification of the film. The commission
had the power to classify films as "Adults Only" if it determined that the film
had pornographic or obscene content. The plaintiffs asserted that the
ordinance and its enforcement violated its First 4 and Fourteenth5 Amendment
rights.
The court held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Commission
had the capacity to be sued under Wisconsin law. The court issued injunctive
relief because the ordinance violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The
court found that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because it
restrained free speech rights and its enforcement would have caused a
reduction in their income that was irremediable in an action at law. The court
also held that the ordinance violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment
rights because it failed to provide clear standards for classification for films
and it failed to provide prompt judicial review of classification decisions by
the Commission.
Kucharek v. Hanaway6
The Denmark Bookstore, which was owned and operated by Shangri-La
Enterprises Inc., sold sexually explicit videotapes. Kucharek, an employee at
the Denmark bookstore, and Shangri-La Enterprises, sued Hanaway, the
attorney general of Wisconsin. They were joined as plaintiffs by Paradise One
and Gem Books, which also sold adult videos. The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's obscenity law.7 The storeowners sought a
preliminary injunction, and Hanaway moved to dismiss the action or to
abstain.
The court granted the preliminary injunction. The storeowners
successfully argued that the statute was vague and it was uncertain what was
covered under the statute. Reasonable doubt existed about what manner of
portrayal qualified as obscene material under the obscenity statute. Abstention
would have been inappropriate since it would have caused further delay
without avoiding constitutional adjudication. The plaintiffs had a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing even though the statute as a whole served a legitimate
state purpose of curtailing commercialized obscenity.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. 714 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
7. WIS. STAT. § 944.21 (2006).
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Kucharek v. Hanaway8
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and vacated the
order for an injunction. The court held that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague. The court found that ambiguity in a statute does not
necessarily make the statute unconstitutionally vague. The court determined
that the state court could easily resolve the ambiguity in the statute in this
situation.
Borger v. Bisciglia9
Several teachers at a high school in Kenosha, Wisconsin, wanted to show
"Schindler's List" in their classrooms. However, the superintendent of the
school system denied the teachers' request because the film was rated "R" and
was thus banned from the curriculum by the school district policies. Ben
Borger, a student, wanted the school board to allow his government class to
show "Schindler's List." He filed an action against the school, the
superintendent, and the school board. Borger claimed that the use of a school
district policy to prohibit viewing R-rated movies by students as a part of the
curriculum violated his First Amendment rights. Borger sought a preliminary
injunction to bar the school district from enforcing its policy about R-rated
movies. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
The court denied the preliminary injunction and held that students' First
Amendment rights are "tempered within the classroom." The court held that
limiting access to materials based on content bears a reasonable relationship to
a legitimate governmental concern. The concern is that high school students
should not be subjected to an R-rated movie due to its violence, nudity, and
bad language. The court stated that the superintendent's use of the rating
system is a reasonable way of determining what material is inappropriate for
students.
2. Intellectual Property Law
Most entertainment entities, such as motion picture companies, rely
heavily on intellectual property rights, for example in films, to generate
substantial revenue streams. The following cases discuss claims of trademark
infringement of a company logo and copyright infringement of motion
8. 902F.2d513 (1990).
9. 888 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
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pictures.
A. Trademark
Trademark holders have a significant interest in the protection of their
trademarks because trademarks are used to identify the source of products.
Trademarks are protected by the Lanham Act. 10 State law provides additional
protection against trademark infringement. This case shows how the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin handled trademark
infringement in the film industry.
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Columbia Tristar Home Video, Inc."
Harley filed a trademark infringement action against defendants
Columbia, Tristar Home Video, New Line Cinema Corp, and New Line Home
Video Inc., alleging that the defendants used Harley's registered logo in
connection with the sale and advertising of a film on videotape. The design
was almost identical to the Harley logo except that the defendants' logo
contained names of the lead actors in the film, not Harley's name.
Defendants filed motions to transfer venue and to seal supporting
affidavits. The court denied the motions, holding that venue was proper since
defendants were engaged in substantial, non-isolated activities in Wisconsin
and that the products serviced or manufactured by the defendants were sold in
Wisconsin in the ordinary course of trade. With respect to the protective
order, defendants failed to address their burden to show good cause as to why
the order was necessary.
B. Copyright
Similar to trademark law, copyright law is very important in the
entertainment industry. This is particularly true in the film industry where the
value of the film is in the copyright held by the company that produced the
film. The federal Copyright Act' 2 protects copyright owners from
infringement. There is one Wisconsin case where an individual illegally
distributed copyrighted films.
10. 15 U.S.C.S. (2006).
11. 851 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
12. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101, et. seq. (2006).
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Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Richardson13
Several motion picture companies filed a copyright infringement suit
against Richardson, an unauthorized distributor who reproduced and
distributed 209 of the companies' copyrighted motion pictures. The
companies moved for summary judgment, and the court granted it along with a
permanent injunction, holding that the companies owned valid copyrights
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). The distributor argued that he did not
personally engage in any illegal duplication of any copyrighted materials.
However, the court held that he was liable for copyright infringement because
the sales or rentals of unauthorized copies of the copyrighted films took place
within the confines of his video store. Furthermore, the distributor had proper
notice that the materials were copyrighted materials.
3. Antitrust
Antitrust laws are designed to protect consumer interests by banning
business activities that lead to a decrease in competition. The federal antitrust
law is codified in the Sherman Antitrust Act, 14 which has two sections.
Section one prohibits agreements among parties that unreasonably restrain
trade.15  Section two prevents an individual or firm from creating a
monopoly. 16
The following two Wisconsin cases deal with antitrust issues involving
concerted action by motion picture companies.
Loew 's, Inc. v. Milwaukee Towne Corp. 17
The plaintiff, Milwaukee Towne Corporation (MTC), operated a motion
picture theatre in downtown Milwaukee. MTC alleged that certain other
Milwaukee theatres were given exclusive first-run opportunities for some
motion pictures and that it was not given the chance to compete for the first-
run licenses. MTC brought an antitrust suit against the defendant motion
picture distributors seeking damages and injunctive relief.
The district court ruled in favor of MTC, and the defendants filed a cross-
complaint to obtain an interpretation of the injunction provision. The district
court held that the decree meant that MTC was entitled to a competitive
13. No. 95-C-0868, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22117 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 1996).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
15. Id. § 1.
16. Id. § 2.
17. 201 F.2d 19(7th Cir. 1952).
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position superior to that of any other operator with respect to its right to obtain
licenses to exhibit motion pictures. The defendants appealed the district
court's interpretation, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the lower
court erroneously construed the decree as meaning the defendants could not
resort to competitive bidding to determine what a fair and reasonable film
rental was. The court found that MTC was not entitled to a position superior
to all other operators, but instead it was entitled to a decree that would place it
in an equal competitive position with other operators.
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc. 18
The U.S. Government filed a civil antitrust action against four motion
picture theatre operators in the Milwaukee area. The defendants owned and
operated most of the first-run movie picture theatres in and around Milwaukee.
The government contended that the defendants' practice of "splitting," or
allocating among themselves the rights to negotiate for films released by
motion picture distributors constitutes a restraint of trade and is per se illegal
under the Sherman Act. 19 The defendants argued that the split was reasonable
under a rule of reason analysis. The court held that defendants intended for the
split to reduce price competition in the market, and the split had many adverse,
indirect effects on the price paid for films. Thus, the court rejected the rule of
reason analysis and determined that the restraint was per se illegal. Even
though the defendants presented evidence that the split had pro-competitive
benefits, the court dismissed the benefits as immaterial. The court entered
judgment for the government and enjoined the defendants from splitting
motion pictures.
III. TELEVISION
Television is another area of the entertainment industry that has sparked
the interest of Wisconsin courts. Like any other state, television is a major
source of entertainment for many people in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's television
disputes have involved many legal issues including tort law, contract law,
intellectual property law, antitrust law, unfair trade practice, and property law.
1. Tort Law
Television stations carry inherent risks for reporting the news. One of
those risks is that individuals may have a tort claim against the station for
18. 568 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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defamation and invasion of privacy. In Wisconsin, there have been three
published cases where individuals claiming defamation and invasion of
privacy have sued television stations.
A. Defamation
Two of the television tort cases in Wisconsin have involved claims of
defamation. The elements of a defamation claim in Wisconsin are "(a) a false
and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication
to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. ' 20 Television
stations need to be conscious of defamation because they are often reporting
information that is harmful to the reputation of others. However, courts have
given stations significant deference when the subject of the news is a public
figure or someone of public interest.
Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff'2
As part of its coverage on the contamination of the City of Milwaukee's
water supply, the defendant television station reported on the plaintiff food
processor's failure to promptly comply with the city's advisory
recommendation for preparing food products and with a federal government
recall order. The plaintiff subsequently sued the television station and the
environmental health specialist who appeared on the television broadcast,
claiming they defamed the food processor.
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that
summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiff fit the status of
being an involuntary, limited purpose public figure with respect to the public
controversy surrounding the potential distribution of contaminated food
products. The plaintiff also did not prove that the television station acted with
"actual malice" when it allegedly made the defamatory statements. Since the
plaintiff admitted that the statements made by the environmental health
specialist were true, summary judgment was also proper regarding the
specialist.
20. Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff, 543 N.W.2d 522, 529 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
21. 543 N.W.2d 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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Erdmann v. SF Broad.22
A sixteen-year-old boy dialed 9-1-1, claiming that a masked man shot him
in the stomach. The boy's father told police that he was certain that the
shooter was Erdmann. The police discovered that Erdmann was a
"survivalist," who could easily access several weapons and had reportedly
been stalking the boy's sister. On the afternoon that the boy was shot, the
sheriff held a news conference. He described the incident as reported to him
and advised reporters that the department was looking for Erdmann, who was
expected to be armed and dangerous. Erdmann was later arrested, and the
defendant television station reported the story on its evening newscast. The
following day, the boy confessed that he shot himself, and the police released
Erdmann. The boy's confession and Erdmann's reaction to the false allegation
were broadcasted numerous times. Erdmann filed a defamation action against
the defendants.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted by the lower
court, and Erdmann appealed. The court of appeals determined that Erdmann
was a limited purpose public figure and was required to provide evidence that
the defendants acted with actual malice in order to prove defamation.
Erdmann did not prove actual malice because there was no evidence that the
newscast was not a fair statement of police information, and no evidence
existed to lead the defendants to believe that the information it received from
the police was not true.
B. Invasion of Privacy
The other television tort case dealt with an invasion of privacy claim.
Individuals have certain rights of privacy. Included in the right of privacy is a
right to keep certain information private. However, as this next case will
show, this right to keep information private becomes much more limited once
the information has been disclosed during the taping of a television program.
Howell v. Tribune Entm 't Co.23
Tammy Howell, a sixteen-year-old, appeared on the Charles Perez Show
along with her older sister and stepmother. The show was produced by
Tribune Entertainment and broadcast nationwide on television. The show was
about how stepchildren and stepparents have had trouble getting along.
During the show, the two sisters engaged in putdowns of their stepmother,
22. 599 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
23. 106 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 1997).
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who in return engaged in putdowns of the two sisters. The stepmother actually
began to read from Tammy's police report during the argument on national
television. The report stated that Tammy engaged in violent, abusive, and
unreasonably loud behavior. The show aired on national television two weeks
after it was taped. After the show aired, Tammy began to have trouble with
her peers and school and eventually was forced to change schools. Tammy
later sued Tribune Entertainment for invasion of privacy, seeking damages for
the humiliation and mental anguish inflicted by the publicity that the broadcast
gave to the contents of the police report.
The district court dismissed the diversity action for failure to state a claim.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision. It held that once Tammy accused
her stepmother of doing bad things, Tammy's character was put at issue. In
order to prevent a one-sided view of the argument, Tribune Entertainment was
allowed to assert the stepmother's privilege of defending her own character.
The court also found that Tammy forfeited any objection to the broadcast by
not complaining prior to the defendant airing show.
2. Contract Law
The following cases deal with issues surrounding television contracts in
Wisconsin. These cases focus on breach of sponsorship contracts, cable
television franchise rights, and contracts between the cable company and its
customers.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 24
CBS sued Amana, a corporate sponsor, for breach of a sponsorship
contract. CBS alleged that Amana failed to make payments set by the
contract. Amana counterclaimed under sections two and three of the Clayton
Act.25 Amana alleged that CBS damaged Amana by (1) granting greater
discounts on the basis of quantity to other sponsors, (2) requiring Amana to
purchase network time over a specified group of television stations, which
included all of the stations owned and operated by CBS, and (3) refusing to
sell network time of Amana's choice to Amana unless Amana agreed to
sponsor a program in which CBS had a financial interest. The district court
dismissed Amana's counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Amana appealed.
The first issue on appeal was whether Amana set forth price
24. 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 14 (2006).
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discrimination in its counterclaim involving purchasers of products of like
grade and quality. The second issue was whether Amana set forth prohibited
tie-in practices in connection with a contract for the sale of goods. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Amana
purchased the privilege of having itself identified as a corporate sponsor of a
given television program and the opportunity to advertise its products during
that program. As such, Amana did not really purchase television time. In
addition, such a sponsorship does not constitute the sale of commodities or
goods for the purposes of the Clayton Act, and therefore, Amana could not
make a price discrimination claim. Finally, the court held that the Clayton Act
does not bar tie-in practices in connection with the sale of goods.
Jones Intercable, Inc. v. City of Stevens Point26
The City of Stevens Point approved the assignment of cable television
franchise rights to Jones, the franchisee, with the provision that Jones not
decrease the number and kinds of basic service channels. Jones subsequently
dropped and replaced two channels from its channel line-up, USA Network
(added a religious network in its place) and WWOR (added TNT in its place).
The city issued a notice of default to Jones stating that Jones must reinstate the
channels or face franchise revocation proceedings. This notice of default was
subsequently dropped but not before Jones filed an action against Stevens
Point for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 198427 and under the First Amendment. Stevens Point argued
that dropping USA Network and WWOR was a violation of the Act and of the
franchise agreement between the two parties. Jones filed a motion for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part.
The district court first held that the city's voluntary withdrawal of the
notice of default did not render the action moot. The court then addressed the
merits of the case, holding that under the Act Jones was not required to request
modification of its franchise agreement before dropping specific cable
channels. The court also held that Jones did not violate its franchise
agreement with Stevens Point when it dropped USA Network from its lineup
and that the Act prohibited the city from requiring Jones to reinstate the two
dropped channels.
The court denied Jones summary judgment with respect to dropping
WWOR from its lineup. The court found that "east coast programming,"
which is what WWOR provided to Stevens Point citizens, was a sufficiently
26. 729 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
27. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (2006).
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broad category within the city's enforcement power and that the programming
was no longer available after Jones dropped WWOR. Based on those
findings, the court decided that the question of whether Jones violated the
franchise agreement in dropping WWOR was not appropriate for summary
judgment.
Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of S.E. Wis. 28
Time Warner imposed a $5 late payment fee on customers who did not
timely pay their monthly cable bill, as specified in their contracts with Time
Warner. Kerry Putnam, Carol Smith-Carter, and Louis Boutan, all customers
of Time Warner, sued individually and on behalf of similarly situated Time
Warner customers. The plaintiffs sought to recover (1) monetary damages for
the portion of the fee. that allegedly was not reasonably related to Time
Warner's actual costs incurred as a result of late payments, (2) declaratory
relief, and (3) injunctive relief. The customers had previously been paying the
$5 late fees but without the knowledge that the actual cost to Time Warner for
the customers not paying on time was around $.38-$.48. Time Warner moved
to dismiss the claims. Milwaukee County Circuit Court dismissed the claims
based on the legal insufficiency of the complaint. The court determined that
the voluntary payment doctrine precluded the claim for monetary damages,
and the declaratory and injunctive relief claims were not ripe for judicial
review because the customers failed to allege a present harm. The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals confirmed the dismissal. The plaintiffs then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
On review, the customers argued that the circuit court erroneously applied
the voluntary payment doctrine to bar their damages claim, and that the court
erroneously disallowed their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
voluntary payment doctrine prevents a person from recovering money that he
or she has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts and without any
hint of fraud, duress, or extortion. Applying the doctrine to the facts of this
case, the court held that it did bar recovery of those late fees the customers
previously paid without protest. The court decided that the fact that the
customers did not know that the actual costs to Time Warner were much lower
than the $5 late payment fee should be likened to a mistake of law, not a
mistake of fact. The court held that since no fraud, duress, or mistake of fact
occurred, the customers' claims for repayment were precluded by their
previous failure to object to the late-payment fees prior to their payment. With
respect to the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief claims, the court held
28. 649 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 2002).
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that the claims were ripe for judicial determination because Time Warner's
future imposition of late fees was an imminent and practical certainty. As
such, the court remanded the issue of whether to give the customers
declaratory and injunctive relief to the circuit court for further proceedings.
3. Intellectual Property Law
Cable and satellite companies own copyrights to their television
programming. Individuals who violate the copyright by stealing the
programming may be prosecuted under federal laws such as the Federal
Communications Act 29 or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 30 The
following two cases deal with issues surrounding the unauthorized interception
of television programming.
DirecTV v. Tasche31
DirecTV, with the assistance of U.S. Marshalls, executed Writs of Seizure
upon an internet seller of devices that were used for the unauthorized
interception of DirecTV's programming. The company's records were seized,
which showed that Randall Tasche purchased twenty signal theft devices from
the online store. DirecTV alleges that Tasche purchased and resold the
devices and that he knowingly and willfully conspired with others to defraud
DirecTV. DirecTV filed an action asserting six claims under three federal
statutes. Tasche challenged DirecTV's standing to assert two claims brought
under the Federal Communications Act 32 (FCA) and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (Wiretap Laws).33 Tasche filed a motion to
dismiss those two claims alleging that they were based on criminal statutes,
and DirecTV could not assert a private right under them. The district court
disagreed with Tasche. The FCA gave standing to DirecTV because it had
proprietary rights in the intercepted communications, and Tasche sold devices
that were intended to illegally intercept programming. With respect to the
Wiretap Laws, Tasche argued that DirecTV could sue only those who directly
intercept, disclose, or intentionally use the interceptor devices, not the
"retailer" of those devices. However, the court adopted the majority view and
interpreted the laws to broadly grant standing to anyone who knew and
intended that the customers would intercept programming. Thus, the court
29. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
31. 316 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
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denied Tasche's motion to dismiss the two claims.
DirecTV v. Valenti34
Time Warner filed a motion for summary judgment to permanently enjoin
the defendant, James Valenti, from illegally receiving its satellite
transmissions. Time Warner claimed it was entitled to statutory damages, a
permanent injunction, and attorney's fees and costs against Valenti. Valenti
failed to respond to the motion within the required thirty-day period. As a
result, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to the proposed findings of fact set forth by DirecTV in its motion. The court
concluded that the facts demonstrated that Valenti violated the Wire and
Electronic Communications Interception Act.35 The court awarded DirecTV
statutory damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The court
granted DirecTV a permanent injunction restraining Valenti from receiving,
assisting others to receive, or advertising a device to receive DirecTV's
satellite transmissions of television programming without authorization and
payment.
4. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law can apply whenever the interests of consumers are
jeopardized because of anticompetitive activities in the market. The only
Wisconsin case dealing with antitrust law's impact on the television industry
involves allegations that a television network located in California was
violating federal and Wisconsin antitrust law.
Lerma v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc. 36
The plaintiffs initially filed an action with the Milwaukee County Circuit
Court seeking to prevent Univision from terminating plaintiffs' W46AR
Channel 46 over-the-air broadcast of Univision's Spanish-language network
programming at the end of their agreement and switching to direct cable
network programming. The basis of the complaint was that such a switch
violated the Sherman Act 37 and Wisconsin's antitrust laws.38
Univision removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity
34. No. 03-C-1327, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738 (E.D. Wis. May 19, 2005).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006).
36. 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
38. WIS. STAT. § 133.03(2) (2006).
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jurisdiction. Two of the plaintiffs, Roman Lerma and Mario Omar, contested
the removal to federal courts since they were citizens of California and
Univision was headquartered in California. The court held that while it was
true that diversity must be complete for subject matter jurisdiction to exist,
plaintiffs could not avoid diversity jurisdiction by fraudulently joining non-
diverse parties, as Univision had alleged. Univision had the burden of proving
fraudulent joinder of Lerma and Omar and had to show that plaintiffs could
not establish a cause of action against Univision. The court looked to the
allegations in the complaint to determine whether the plaintiffs could establish
a cause of action under Wisconsin's antitrust law. Univision argued that
plaintiffs could not establish an antitrust injury under the facts of the case.
The court agreed with Univision that, while the alleged illegal conduct by
Univision may have injured the plaintiffs, it remained to be seen whether the
switch to cable is anticompetitive conduct. As such, the plaintiffs' injuries
were not antitrust injuries. Since the claims failed to assert any form of
anticompetitive conduct on the part of Univision, the court held that Univision
met its burden. Removal was thus proper, and the claims were dismissed.
5. Unfair Trade Practices
Conduct that is deemed to be an unfair trade practice is similar to an
antitrust violation in that the conduct creates an unfair advantage in the market
place. The following case involved a situation where the Wisconsin courts
had to determine whether federal consumer protection laws preempted
Wisconsin's unfair trade practice laws with respect to cable television
programming.
Time Warner Cable v. Doyle39
After the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 (Cable Act) 40 became effective, Time Warner's service was restructured
to remove certain channels from its basic and standard services. Time Warner
subsequently offered those channels as options to receive "a la carte" for an
extra premium each month. After the restructuring, all Time Warner
subscribers were still able to receive the same number of channels for the same
price. The Wisconsin Attorney General, Doyle, brought an administrative
action before the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection. Doyle charged Time Warner with violating Wisconsin's unfair
39. 847 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
40. 47 U.S.C.S. § 609 (2006).
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trade practice law4' for its practice of charging for a package of "a la carte"
channels without obtaining an order requesting these channels by name.
Doyle claimed Time Warner engaged in "negative option billing," which is an
unfair trade practice under section 100.20. Time Warner sought to enjoin
Doyle's action, claiming that federal law precludes the application of state
law.
The court held that the state's regulation over negative billing did not
conflict with the Cable Act or any other federal regulation. The court
reasoned that the Cable Act clearly forbade cable operators from charging
subscribers for services that the subscribers had not affirmatively requested by
name, despite an FCC regulation that seemed to carve out an exception
allowing cable operators to engage in negative billing in situations involving
the addition or deletion of specific channels from an existing tier of service.
Thus, the court decided that it would not give deference to the FCC regulation.
The court denied Time Warner's motion for summary judgment and entered
judgment for Doyle.
Time Warner Cable v. Doyle42
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The
court determined that the Cable Act was ambiguous, and thus, the FCC's
regulation that conflicted with Wisconsin's law had to be given full deference
from courts under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.43 Since the FCC regulation was a permissible interpretation of the
congressional authority given to it by the Cable Act, it shielded Time Warner's
billing practice from the scope of Wisconsin's unfair trade practices statute.44
6. Property Law
There have been only a few Wisconsin entertainment industry cases
involving property law. The following three cases pertain to the zoning and
land use issues that television stations have had with cities and municipalities
regarding the construction and maintenance of television antennas.
41. WIS. STAT. § 100.20 (2006).
42. 66 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 1995).
43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44. WIS. STAT. § 100.20 (2006).
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State ex. rel. v. Seyberth45
The State of Wisconsin brought an action against the members of the State
Conservation Commission of Wisconsin (Commission), the members of the
State of Wisconsin Radio Council (Radio Council), and the Wisconsin Valley
Television Corporation (TV Corporation). The State sought a judgment
declaring an agreement that all three defendants entered in to be ultra vires
and void. The TV Corporation entered into a lease with the Commission for
land sitting atop Rib Mountain, one of the highest locations in Wisconsin and
a state park location, so that the TV Corporation could erect, maintain, and
operate a television-radio tower and a television transmission building. The
tower was a total of 648 feet in height. Under the agreement, all
communications facilities on the property would be transferred to the one
tower that was being constructed.
The State argued that the lease was in violation of article XI of the
Wisconsin Constitution 46 because that provision restricted the power of the
legislature to authorize a lease of state park lands and because such
restrictions, in particular the lease of the land for park purposes, had not been
complied with. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the
circuit court denied. On appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the
small amount of land involved did not interfere with the enjoyment of the park
by the public and noted that a radio tower already existed on the property. The
court pointed out that nothing in the Wisconsin statute, which granted the
leasing power to the Commission47 restricted the leasing power to park
purposes. The court held that the public derived benefits from the lease,
including improved police radio communications and improved television
reception to residents.
Beardsley v. City of Darlington48
The City of Darlington authorized the expenditure of taxpayers' money for
the purpose of erecting and maintaining a television-translator station.
Beardsley, a taxpayer, contended that using taxpayers' money for the
construction and maintenance of a television-translator station violated the
federal and state constitutions, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.49 The circuit court ruled in favor of
45. 101 N.W.2d 118(Wis. 1960).
46. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a).
47. WIS. STAT. § 27.01(2)(g) (2006).
48. 111 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 1961).
49. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV.
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Darlington. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the circuit
court's decision. The court could not see how the constitutional provisions
provided by Beardsley related to the city's proposal to erect a municipal
television-translator station. The court found nothing in the Wisconsin
Constitution prohibiting the legislature from granting authority to cities to
undertake such projects provided the expenditure was for a legitimate public
purpose. The court held that improving the quality of television service in
communities where reception was limited and inferior, served a legitimate
public purpose. There was also nothing in the State of Wisconsin's statute
governing municipalities 50 that prohibited the city's erection of the translator.
As such, the means that Darlington used to improve the quality of television
reception were permissible in the promotion of public health, safety, and
welfare.
Hearst-Argyle Stations, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning5
The FCC issued a directive requiring all television stations to begin
broadcasting DTV signals to its broadcast areas by May 1, 2002. In deciding
to comply with the FCC's directive by top-mounting the DTV antenna, WISN-
TV Channel 12 (the station) petitioned BOZA for a special use and variance
permit, which would give the station permission to construct an addition to its
existing tower for the purpose of mounting a DTV antenna on top of the
existing analog antenna. The tower's current height was 1106 feet, and with
the addition, the tower's height would increase by 116 feet for a total height of
1222 feet. The Board of Zoning Appeals for the City of Milwaukee (BOZA)
determined that the increase was not necessary for the "public convenience,"
which was one of the then-existing special use permit requirements. BOZA
argued that the tower extension was not necessary since a side-mounted DTV
antenna on its own tower could be temporarily set up until the analog antenna
could be removed. As such, BOZA denied the station's zoning permit
application.
The station commenced two actions, seeking both mandamus and
certiorari relief. The circuit court affirmed the decision of BOZA. On appeal,
the station argued that by side-mounting the DTV antenna on the station's
present tower, the station would lose about 3000 viewers within the City of
Milwaukee. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the loss was not so
great as to create a "public inconvenience" such that top-mounting rather than
side-mounting was necessary for the public convenience. BOZA's decision
50. WIS. STAT. § 62 (2006).
51. 659 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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was thus not arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable since the station could still
reach 99.5% of the viewing area. The court affirmed the circuit court's
judgment.
IV. MusIc
The music industry is another part of the entertainment industry that has
seen issues litigated in Wisconsin courts. The focus of most of the cases
involving musical recordings is intellectual property law, namely copyright
infringement. The cases usually involve the owner of a copyright enforcing its
right to prevent violators from illegally playing or selling the music.
However, contractual and employment disputes can arise in the musical arena
as well, as the following Wisconsin cases exhibit.
1. Contract Law
Contracts are very important in the music industry because most
production of music relies on contractual relationships between parties, such
as artists and the record companies that produce the music. Only one contract
case involving music has been litigated in Wisconsin. The case involved a
contractual dispute between a music festival and a talent agency.
Grenier & Moore Prod., Inc. v. Chippewa Valley County Festival, Inc. 52
Chippewa Valley (CVCF) sponsored three music festivals in 1994 and
hired Grenier & Moore (agency) to act as a talent buyer for the festivals. The
two parties entered into a written agreement, with the terms being that the
agency would act "only as the entertainment negotiator." The terms of the
contracts with the entertainers were set out in written contracts between the
agency and the festival. After entering into the contract, CVCF wanted to
change provisions of the contracts between it and the entertainers. CVCF tried
to get the entertainers to sign addendums changing the contracts. The agency,
on behalf of CVCF, also attempted to get the entertainers to agree to the
changes and sign the addendums. Some of the entertainers refused to sign the
addendums. CVCF then decided not to pay the agency's commission, and the
agency sued for breach of contract. CVCF counterclaimed for breach of
fiduciary duty.
The circuit court found that the CVCF did breach the contract, and the
agency did not breach its fiduciary duty. The court of appeals affirmed the
circuit court's decision, holding that no evidence supported CVCF's argument
52. 546 N.W.2d 580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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that the agency, by saying it would attempt to get the entertainers to sign the
addendums, constituted an oral agreement to make the changes requested by
CVCF. The agency merely had a duty to negotiate, not to guarantee the
results of the negotiation. The court also found that for the agency to forfeit
its commission under breach of fiduciary duty principles, a finding of "gross
mismanagement, gross misconduct, gross unskillfulness, or unfaithfulness ' '53
would have to occur. There was no evidence presented to prove any of these
standards.
2. Tort Law
Torts claims could also be important in music because so many parties
rely on each other in the production of music; however, Wisconsin has only
seen one tort case in this area. The case pertained to a legal malpractice
lawsuit arising out of a dispute between a rock band and its personal manager
over the ownership of certain musical recordings.
McCraw v. Mensch54
McCraw, a resident of Wisconsin, was the personal manager of the rock
band the BoDeans from about 1986-2003. He formed a music publishing
company, Lla-Mann, with the members of the BoDeans for the purpose of
owning the copyrights of all the BoDeans' songs. Mensch, an entertainment
law attorney and member of the Illinois Bar, represented McCraw on various
business affairs including the formation of Lla-Mann. The BoDeans fired
McCraw in 2003, which created a dispute as to who owned the copyrighted
material formed under the Lla-Mann company. The band ended up suing
McCraw over ownership of the songs, and McCraw lost. McCraw then sued
Mensch in a Wisconsin Circuit Court alleging negligence, strict responsibility
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Mensch filed a motion to
transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
The court granted Mensch's motion after looking at the relevant factors:
convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and the interest of
justice.
3. Intellectual Property Law
Musicians and producers rely heavily on the income generated from
owning the copyrights to their musical recordings. As such, copyright owners
53. Id.
54. No. 06-C-0086, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11683 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 2006).
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vigorously enforce their copyrights, as the following Wisconsin cases show.
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young55
Leo Feist, Inc. was formed to represent composers, enforce copyrights
owned by composers, and collect royalties. One representative of Leo Feist
was located in Wisconsin to demand and collect royalties from any copyright
violators in that state. The defendants operated taverns all across Wisconsin
and played music for the enjoyment of their guests. Feist sued the taverns
under the Copyright Act 6 to collect royalties allegedly due for the playing of
copyrighted music. The taverns countersued, asking for injunctive relief to
prevent Feist from interfering with their playing of music. The court
dismissed both parties' claims. The court held that the taverns were not
entitled to relief because they were not being forced to operate taverns or to
play music, and they were violating federal copyright laws. The court
dismissed Feist's claim because at no time did the association file for and
obtain a license to represent composers in Wisconsin nor did it pay a franchise
tax on receipts obtained in Wisconsin, all of which was required by then
existing Wisconsin law. Thus, the representative of Feist was in contravention
of Wisconsin law, and the court would not let Feist collect royalties. Feist
argued that the statute violated equal protection by its classification of Feist
because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose. The court determined that the statute in question did not violate the
U.S. Constitution.
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young 57
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Feist's noncompliance with
Wisconsin law did not preclude federal copyright infringement suits because
Feist had a valid copyright that was protected under general equitable
principles and the Copyright Act itself. The Wisconsin statute was not
relevant or material to the copyright infringement action. Thus, the judgment
dismissing Feist's action was reversed.
Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Econ. Consultants, Inc.58
Mercury and eight other record companies brought suit against Economic
55. 46 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 25 (2006).
57. 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943).
58. 218 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1974).
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Consultants alleging unfair competition due to Economic Consultants'
copying of music recordings produced by the record companies. The record
companies sought a temporary injunction from the circuit court, and Economic
Consultants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The circuit court sustained Economic Consultants'
demurrer. The record companies appealed, arguing that they had a cause of
action for misappropriation under common law unfair competition
principles. 59 Economic Consultants argued that misappropriation did not
apply because (1) states could not constitutionally regulate record piracy by
common law; (2) misappropriation claims as applied in this case have been
severely restricted; (3) after the record companies sold the records, they had no
property interest in the music to protect; (4) re-release of old songs by the
record companies after a certain date subjected those songs to federal
protection and removed them from state protection, and (5) the courts should
defer to Congress with respect to controlling music piracy.
Congress had not acted or devised a scheme that applied to the subject
matter of this action. Therefore, the court held that states could regulate music
piracy by statute and common law. Congress's failure to preempt the area of
record piracy subjected the actions of Economic Consultants to state unfair
competition law; therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the circuit court's order with direction to reconsider the question of
granting a temporary injunction.
Cayman Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger6°
Reichenberger gave a public performance of a copyrighted composition.
Cayman Music brought a civil action for injunctive relief and monetary
damages against Reichenberger, alleging infringement of a copyright that
belonged to Cayman. Cayman brought the suit under the Copyright Act. 61
Reichenberger moved for a trial by jury, and Cayman moved to strike the
motion. The issue in the case was how the court should rule on the motion.
Cayman asserted that its action was solely for injunctive relief and that the
damages requested were for only the minimum statutory amount; therefore,
Reichenberger had no right to a jury trial on any of the issues. Reichenberger
asserted that since Cayman was asking for monetary damages, it raised a legal
59. The elements of a misappropriation cause of action, which were developed in International
News Services v. Associated Press are: (1) time, labor, and money expended in the creation of the
thing misappropriated; (2) competition; and (3) commercial damage to the plaintiff. 248 U.S. 215
(1918).
60. 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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issue suitable for a jury trial. The court held that a jury trial was not required
under the Act when the relief sought was limited to a request for injunctive
relief and for minimum statutory damages. The remedy sought by Cayman
was equitable in nature and was not for compensation or punitive damages.
The court granted Cayman's motion to strike the demand for a jury trial.
George Simon, Inc. v. Spat 62
The plaintiffs were music publishers and members of the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), which was a
musical professional society. Each of the plaintiffs granted to the ASCAP a
non-exclusive right to license public performances for profit of each of their
copyrighted musical recordings. ASCAP, on behalf of its members, licensed
radio stations, television stations, night clubs, restaurants, and others places
who wanted to publicly perform the copyrighted compositions in ASCAP's
"library." Spatz owned the Green Bough Lounge, and he provided live
performances of plaintiffs' copyrighted compositions while refusing to obtain
a license with ASCAP. Plaintiffs filed consolidated civil actions for monetary
and injunctive relief based on copyright infringement, 63 and they moved for
summary judgment. Spatz did not deny the allegations; however, he argued
that plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that the works played were exactly
the same as those copyrighted. The court did not accept Spatz's argument,
holding that plaintiffs merely needed to prove that their works were
performed, not that the exhibitions at Spatz's lounge were identical to the
copyrighted works. Since the works were held out to be performances of the
copyrighted compositions, the degree of similarity to the original was
irrelevant.
Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini64
The plaintiffs were owners of copyrights to various songs. Muedini
owned the Port Town Restaurant. Muedini played music from a Milwaukee
radio station while patrons were dining. One day in 1992, the plaintiffs sent
an investigator to determine if copyrighted music was being played. The
investigator noted that six songs that the plaintiffs owned copyrights to were
62. 492 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (provides that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner is an infringer of the copyright). 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (provides that with
respect to musical works, the copyright owner has exclusive rights to perform the copyrighted work
publicly and to authorize the public performance of the copyrighted work).
64. 821 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
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played on the radio station at the restaurant. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that
the "public performance" of copyrighted musical compositions constituted
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 65 which provides that
copyright owners hold the exclusive right to control public performances of
their works. Plaintiffs sought $1000 in damages for each of the six songs
played over the radio at the restaurant, an injunction, costs, and attorneys fees.
Muedini failed to respond to the suit, and plaintiffs filed a motion for a default
judgment. The court refused to grant the motion, holding that Muedini's
actions were exempt under another provision of the Copyright Act.66 The
exemption applied to this case because the restaurant did not charge a fee to
hear the radio broadcast and the transmission of the musical performances
were made through a single radio player commonly used in private homes.
Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini67
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed the district court erred in finding that
Muedini's receiving apparatus was the kind commonly used in a private home.
The restaurant's sound system used a "Realistic" brand receiver, which was
sold for $200 at a Radio Shack. The sound system also used a separate control
panel containing five selector switches and nine speakers, each with eight-
inch loudspeakers contained in them. A transformer was also used to increase
the wattage going to all the speakers. Considering the entire system, the court
reversed the district court's decision. The court found that Muedini's audio
system was not composed of only home-type components, and was not
configured in a manner commonly found in a home. As such, the court held
that Muedini was not statutorily exempt from the Copyright Act under section
110(5).
4. Employment Law
Employment law issues are relevant in music. In the music industry the
question of who is an employee often arises, because many people in the
industry operate as independent contractors. The following case considers
whether musical entertainers who obtain their work from entertainment
agencies are employees of the agency.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006).
67. 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Foard v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm 'n68
Foard owned Les Artistes, a musical entertainment agency that placed
musicians with clients seeking entertainment for social events. When a client
requested musical entertainers for social events, Foard contacted the
musicians, asked about their availability, and told them about the
compensation. If the musicians were available and willing to perform
services, then Foard provided details about the job's location and when to
arrive. When the job was completed, Foard compensated the musicians. The
issue in this case was whether the musicians were employees of Foard.
An administrative law judge found Foard was liable to the musicians for
unemployment compensation distributions. The Labor and Industry Review
Commission affirmed that decision. Foard brought the action to the
Wisconsin state courts, and the circuit court reversed the Commission's
decision, stating that the musicians were not Foard's employees under
Wisconsin law. 69 The Commission appealed the circuit court's decision, and
the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. Since the musicians performed
services for pay, the court had to determine whether the Foard was exempted
from paying unemployment compensation by the provisions of the Wisconsin
Act.70 The court first found that the musicians were free from Foard's control
or direction over the performance of their services under their contracts. The
court also found that the musicians performed their services in an
independently established profession in which they were customarily engaged.
No evidence existed that the musicians were economically dependent on
Foard. Therefore, the court held that the musicians were actually independent
contractors and not employees of Foard.
V. RADIO
Some of the oldest cases in the entertainment law field come from
disputes involving radio. These are some of the oldest cases because radio
predates many of the other entertainment industries. These disputes include
tort cases, contract cases, intellectual property cases, and property cases.
1. Tort Law
Most tort cases involving radio are cases of defamation. Even though there
is not much statutory law involving radio, there is a statute on defamation for
68. No. 94-2889, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 997 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1996).
69. WIS. STAT. § 108.02(12) (2006).
70. Id. § 108.02(12)(b).
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both television and radio. 7' The statute states that a radio station cannot be
held liable for defamatory statements made by a candidate if the network
cannot sensor the script of the broadcast; 72 however, there is no case law
interpreting or applying the statute. In general, courts are reluctant to find
defamation because they do not want to prevent the media from being able to
fully exercise its First Amendment73 rights.
Singler v. Journal Co.74
Singler was the president of the Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, a
group of over 8000 dairy farmers who had a dispute with how large dairy
companies distributed milk. The co-op members and officials decided to
withhold their product until a "fair price" was paid. During the production
strike, Singler was referred to as a racketeer and compared to Chicago
gangsters during a Journal Company radio broadcast. Singler brought a
defamation suit against the Journal Company. The jury found the statements
were not defamatory, and Slinger appealed.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that the issue was one for a jury to
determine, and the jury was entitled to determine that the comments broadcast
on the defendant's station did not amount to defamation. The court also noted
that it examined the jury instructions and the lower court's rejection of
evidence did not constitute a prejudicial error.
Giwosky v. Journal Co.75
Giwosky was a landlord whose name was mentioned during a series of
radio and television broadcasts discussing "absentee landlords." Giwosky
claimed his business and reputation were damaged because of one of the
broadcasts. Although he claimed the information in the broadcast was not
false, he claimed it was "grossly misleading." Giwosky claimed that the
broadcast showed a property that was not his at the time of the report. He also
claimed that the broadcast implied that he sold his properties to evade federal
rent control. Finally, Giwosky contended that he was defamed by the entire
series because there was enough of a bridge between the broadcasts to
implicitly refer to him. The circuit court granted judgment for the plaintiff,
and the defendant appealed.
71. WIs. STAT. § 895.052 (2006).
72. Id.
73. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
74. 260 N.W. 431 (Wis. 1935).
75. 237 N.W.2d 36 (Wis. 1976).
[Vol. 17:2
ENTERTAINMENT LA WIN WISCONSIN
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the circuit court's decision
and remanded the case with an order for summary judgment on behalf of the
defendant. The court found that the broadcast that mentioned the plaintiff was
not defamatory and that "an ordinary person with an ordinary mind" would not
understand it to defame him. The court noted that the other broadcasts were
not defamatory because he was not referenced in or linked to the other
broadcasts.
Lewis v. Coursolle Broad.76
James R. Lewis was a former state legislator who resigned from public
office after being convicted of perjury and sentenced to six months in prison.
After being released, he petitioned the court to vacate the conviction. As a
result of his effort to vacate the conviction, information presented to the grand
jury about Lewis's illegal activity became public. The newspapers then
published the information. Two years later, a radio broadcast confused James
W. Lewis, who was attempting to extort the makers of Tylenol, with James R.
Lewis. The broadcast mistakenly described James R. Lewis's background as
state legislator when discussing James W. Lewis's efforts to extort Tylenol.
After learning about its mistake, the station broadcast retractions that day and
the following day. Lewis filed a claim of defamation, and the circuit court
granted summary judgment to the broadcaster.
In affirming the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin noted that a court, and not a jury, must determine if a person was a
"public figure" for a defamation case. The court held that when a defamation
action is brought against the media there is a higher standard of proof for
public figures. Lewis argued he was not a public figure since he had been out
of office for three years when the broadcast occurred. The court determined
that he was a public figure, and there was a public interest in information
about him. The court also found that in his attempt to vacate his conviction,
he kept himself as a public figure. The court, relying on earlier U.S. Supreme
Court opinions that required public figures to prove actual malice in
defamation cases, noted that Lewis needed to show there was "actual malice"
on the part of the broadcast. Lewis was unable to show actual malice because
failure to investigate the accuracy of information would not qualify as actual
malice.
76. 377 N.W.2d 166 (Wis. 1985).
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2. Contract Law
Contract law is an important area of the law that has a significant
impact on the radio industry. As in many industries, employment contracts are
an important part of the contract case law for that industry. The following two
cases involve employment contract disputes between radio employees and
station owners.
Journal Co. v. Bundy77
Bundy had a musical-variety radio show using the nickname "Heinie"
in Detroit. He contacted WTMJ, operated by the Journal Company, to
produce a similar show. The parties entered into a written contract, which
prohibited Bundy from using the nickname in the Milwaukee area for sixty
days after the expiration of the contract. That contract expired four years later.
Bundy terminated his employment after eleven years to go to New York.
Throughout the time Bundy's show ran on WTMJ, he used the phrase "Band
of Million Friends." Several years later Bundy returned to the Milwaukee area
and broadcast a show on WMAW using the phrase "Heinie and His Band - the
Band of Million Airs" for advertising purposes. The Journal Company sought
to prevent Bundy from using "Heinie" and "Band of Million Airs." The lower
court restrained Bundy from using the "Band of Million Airs" because it was
confusingly similar to the "Band of Million Friends." However, because
Bundy had been known professionally as "Heinie" and because the Journal
Company could not show that it would face irreparable harm if Bundy
continued to use the nickname "Heinie," the lower court denied the Journal
Company's request to prevent him from using the name.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision
because there was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that there
was not a "great weight and preponderance of the evidence" to support the
decision.
Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B 'Nai B'Rith78
Augustine was an employee of a Milwaukee radio station. He was
fired because he failed to delete a guest's racist comments from a broadcast
and failed to play the disclaimer stating that the views of the guests were not
the views of the station and its management. The station received numerous
complaints about the broadcast, one of which was from the Anti-Defamation
77. 37 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1949).
78. 249 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. 1977).
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League (ADL). Augustine then filed a suit against the ADL and the general
manger of the radio station, claiming that firing him violated Wisconsin's Fair
Employment Act, that the ADL complaint interfered with his contract, and that
there was a conspiracy between the defendants. The lower court granted
summary judgment for the ADL, and Augustine appealed.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that there was no discrimination
by the ADL and that the guest's philosophy was not protected under the Fair
Employment Act under the definition of "creed." Under the Fair Employment
Act, a person could not be fired for his or her creed. The court then turned to
Webster's Dictionary to define creed as "a system of religion or religious
faith," and not political philosophy. The court determined that the ADL's call
was not intended to interfere with Augustine's contract, and there were twenty
to thirty other calls complaining about the broadcast as well. Finally,
Augustine could not prove there was a conspiracy. The lower court's
judgment was affirmed.
3. Intellectual Property Law
Intellectual property rights are especially important in the radio
industry. As the Journal Co. v. Bundy 79 case showed, trademarks are important
in identifying people on the radio because they are recognized only by their
nicknames and voices. Trademarks can also be used to identify radio stations
themselves.
The federal courts and Wisconsin state courts apply a "likelihood of
confusion" standard in determining whether there is trademark infringement.
The following two cases demonstrate how the courts have applied this
standard to radio trademarks in Wisconsin.
M.B.H. Enters., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc.8°
M.B.H was a Colorado company that registered the service mark "I
love you" for "entertainment services in the nature of radio programs and
personal appearances by a disc jockey." Thirty radio stations licensed its
promotion, including WISN, which broadcast "I Love you Milwaukee" 180
times a week. The station also sold t-shirts and glassware with the slogan.
WISN used the promotion for over two years, but cancelled it after a rival
radio station used "WOKY loves Milwaukee" and used the "loves
Milwaukee" with various disc jockey names. WOKY's slogan was also found
79. 37 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1949).
80. 633 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1980).
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on billboards and bumper stickers. M.B.H sued WOKY, seeking an injunction
and damages for trademark infringement, trademark disparagement, and unfair
competition. The district court granted summary judgment for WOKY.
M.B.H appealed on the issue of infringement.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. When
analyzing whether there was a case of infringement, the Seventh Circuit
considered whether WOKY's use of the slogan was intended to be a service
mark. The court held that the phrase was not being used as a service mark, but
instead to describe its services. Furthermore, the court found that the words
themselves were descriptive, not fanciful or arbitrary, and not intended to
function as a service mark. The court also found that there was no likelihood
of confusion that consumers would confuse the slogan for a service mark, or
be confused by the slogan because the station included its call letters.
Bartell Broadcasters, Inc. v. Milwaukee Broad. Co.81
Bartell Broadcasters (Bartell) broadcasted a radio program called "Mad
Man Michaels Program" for seven years, when the defendant Milwaukee
Broadcasting Company (MBC), a rival broadcasting company, began running
advertisements that "Mad Man Michaels is back." The defendant's program
was set to air during approximately the same hours as Bartell's programming,
and Bartell claimed that MBC used advertising designed to confuse and
mislead listeners. However, the disc jockey who was known as "Mad Man
Michaels," "The Mad One," and "The Mad Man," was no longer employed by
the plaintiff and had become employed by the defendant. The plaintiffs sought
a temporary injunction to prevent the defendant from using "Mad Man
Michaels," and the circuit court denied the injunction.
The circuit court determined that the plaintiff did not clearly
demonstrate the necessity of the injunction. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
affirmed the circuit court's denial of the temporary injunction because the
court did not find that the circuit court abused its discretion.
4. Property Law
Property law has less significance in radio than some of the other
entertainment fields; however, because zoning laws regulate what specific
land can be used for, it is relevant to radio. If the land is designated to be used
for a specific purpose, it has to be used for that purpose. Zoning law issues in
radio often relate to construction of a radio tower at a specific location. The
81. 108 N.W.2d 129(Wis. 1961).
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following case is the only reported Wisconsin case that involved this type of
dispute.
Bd. of Regents v. Dane County Bd. ofAdjustment82
A landowner applied for a conditional use permit for the construction
of a radio tower, which he intended to lease to the University of Wisconsin.
The University of Wisconsin would have been responsible for building and
operating the student-run tower. The Zoning and Natural Resources
Committee found that the radio tower would qualify as government use and
granted a conditional use permit. The Board of Adjustment (BOA)
determined it was not a government use because it was not "an integral part of
[the] educational mission" of the university. The Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin filed a complaint in the circuit court, and the court
reversed the BOA decision stating that it overstepped its jurisdiction without
evidence supporting its decision. The BOA appealed.
Because the court of appeals determined that this case would impact
other counties, it decided to review the case de novo. The court determined
that "government use" would allow the government to determine how to use
the land within the statutory constraints. Because the radio would be paid for
by student fees and allocated funds, would be run by students and faculty, and
would be implemented as a teaching tool, the court determined that the tower
fell under the category of "government use" and affirmed the circuit court's
decision.
VI. ART, PUBLISHING, & PERFORMANCE
Art, publishing, and performance is a large part of the entertainment
industry because it encompasses so many things, including books, book stores,
newspapers, magazines, paintings, and dance. With so many different topics,
there are a variety of cases that arise out of this category. There is a
substantial amount of case law in this area, spanning throughout the twentieth
century.
1. Tort Law
All of the tort cases involving art, publishing, and performance are cases
of defamation. The Wisconsin cases that have been litigated in this area have
dealt with publishing, not art or performance. Because these cases involve
written publication, they involve a number of allegations of libel. The
82. 618 N.W.2d 537 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
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defamation standards are the same in this area as those already discussed.
There must be "actual malice" for there to be defamation of a public figure.
Generally, courts give the media some level of deference because they fear
chilling the free speech rights of the media.
Robinson v. Eau Claire Book & Stationery Co.83
The plaintiff and the defendants published different Eau Claire directories.
The defendants allegedly published articles in two newspapers and a circular
accusing the plaintiff of being unscrupulous and scheming to steal the money
of the residents of Eau Claire. However, the defendants denied that they were
the parties that published the articles. A jury found that the articles were
defamatory and awarded the plaintiff $1500. The court then granted a motion
for the defendants to set aside the verdict giving the plaintiff the option to take
a reduced amount. He chose the option, and judgment was entered in his favor
to which the defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and remanded the lower
court's decision. The court noted that the language used in the circular was
libel per se, and the defendants did not have the right to publish an article that
would harm the plaintiffs business. The court also noted that there was not
enough evidence that the defendants published the articles that appeared in the
newspapers, and because the defendants denied publishing the articles, the
jury should not have been presented with the question of libel as to the
newspapers.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier84
The plaintiff newspaper company, owner of the Milwaukee Journal,
requested information on arrests, and Breier, the Chief of Police for the City of
Milwaukee, agreed to provide information about people who had been taken
into custody. The information submitted to the newspaper included the name,
age, and date of birth of all persons taken into custody, as well as when they
were arrested and who the arresting officer was. Breier would not disclose the
charges or the names of any informants because of concerns that such
disclosure would possibly cause personal or economic harm to individuals
arrested. The newspaper wanted to know the charges brought against the
arrested parties, and filed suit for declaratory judgment stating that it was
entitled to such information. The trial court ruled in favor of the newspaper
and ordered that the charges be disclosed within forty-eight hours of the arrest;
83. 85 N.W. 983 (Wis. 1901).
84. 279 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1979).
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however, the court gave the police the option to refuse to disclose certain
arrests within the forty-eight-hour requirement as long they gave specific
reasons for doing so.
Neither party was satisfied with the ruling. The newspaper appealed,
arguing that it should be given immediate access to all information pursuant to
Wisconsin law.85 Breier also appealed, arguing that no charges should ever be
disclosed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the trial court's ruling
and ordered Breier to provide daily arrest records to the newspaper and the
public. The court held that arrest records, including the charges made, are
considered public information pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 19.21.
The court also found that the public's right to the information outweighed any
privacy interests of the accused.
Simonson v. United Press Int'l, Inc.86
The United Press and Associated Press released several news dispatches
on Judge Simonson's comments when sentencing a fifteen-year-old boy who
pled "no contest" for a second-degree assault. The information about
Simonson's statements in the dispatch came from a Wisconsin State Journal
article "proposed" for publication, which was slightly different from the final
published article. Simonson sued for libel, and the defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment.
The court noted that although the words chosen in the news dispatches
were provocative, they were substantially true and therefore protected from
libel. The court further noted that because the judge was a public official and
the case was a matter of public concern, even if the dispatches were false there
would need to be actual malice for the plaintiff to be able to recover.
Simonson was unable to show actual malice. Because the dispatches were
substantially true and there was no proof of malice the court granted summary
judgment for the defendants.
Harris v. Quadracci87
Lynnette Harris, a well known model and actress, and her twin sister were
prosecuted for tax evasion in federal court in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. They were charged with willful failure to report money they
received from an elderly widower as income. The sisters were convicted, but
the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that the money the
85. WIS. STAT. § 19.21 (2006).
86. 500 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
87. 856 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
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sisters received was a gift, not taxable income. Before the convictions were
reversed and while Harris was in jail, the media discovered the story, and a
magazine article was printed about Harris. She claims that there were several
defamatory statements made about her in the article.
Harris filed a defamation action against the magazine owner, its publisher,
the writer, and Harris's biographer. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The court stated that Harris had to prove actual malice to recover
damages on a defamation action against the media. Because of the
considerable media coverage the tax case received and the numerous
interviews Harris granted, she became a narrow purpose public figure.
Therefore, she had to prove that the writer acted with the knowledge that the
statements were false or acted with reckless disregard of whether they were
false. Harris did not prove actual malice; thus, summary judgment was
granted for the writer, the magazine owner, and the publisher. With respect to
the biographer, summary judgment was also granted because none of the
statements made by the biographer were defamatory.
Harris v. Quadracci88
On appeal, Harris claimed that the district court erred in concluding that
she was a limited purpose public figure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, stating that the magazine article was relevant to
Harris's tax evasion controversy, which was of substantial public interest;
therefore, Harris qualified as a limited purpose public figure.
Milsap v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. 89
The Journal Sentinel, which published the Milwaukee Journal, ran a story
written by Gregory D. Stanford about the life and career of colleague Carol
Malone after her death. The article accused James Milsap, who ran a training
program and a facility that published a newspaper called The Torch, of not
paying people he owed and noted that the highlight of Malone's career was
running Milsap out of town. Milsap sued the Journal Sentinel, Stanford, the
editor of the editorial page, and the head of the legal department for, among
other claims, defamation. The district court held that the article was a
statement of opinion and therefore not actionable. The court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the
88. 48 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1995).
89. 897 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd in part, 100 F.3d 1265 (7th Cir. 1996).
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statement "he simply reneged on paying people" was actionable. The court
further noted that because the statement could have affected Milsap's business,
there was an issue of fact as to whether there was defamation. However, the
court determined that Milsap was a public figure, and thus, the defendant
needed to have actual malice in making the statement. The question of
whether there was actual malice was to be left for a jury to decide. Therefore,
the court reversed and remanded the decision as to Stanford, but it affirmed
the summary judgment as to the other parties.
Torgerson v. Journal Sentinel, Inc.90
Torgerson held public office as Wisconsin's deputy commissioner of
insurance. He was also half owner of a title insurance company. The
Milwaukee Journal published an article accusing Torgerson of being unethical
and violating conflict of interest restraints. The article was also reprinted in
other newspapers. Torgerson sued for libel.
The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. Both
parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin consolidated the
cases. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision as to the
Journal and granted summary judgment on behalf of the Journal. The court
held that there was no actual malice, which is required when a public official
claims a newspaper published something that was false and defamatory. The
court of appeals affirmed the decision to deny Torgerson summary judgment.
Torgerson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which affirmed
the court of appeals's decision because there was no evidence of actual malice.
2. Contract Law
In the area of art, publishing, and performance there are numerous types of
contractual relationships, such as employment contracts, licensing contracts,
and promotional contracts. In licensing contracts, an artist could contract with
a third party in order to mass-distribute his or her art. A licensing contract was
the basis for the single Wisconsin case in this category.
Zoellick v. Unger9l
Zoellick, an artist, entered into a one-year agreement with Northwoods
Craftman to reproduce, advertise, promote, and sell his art. Northwoods
would pay Zoellick twenty-five percent of the wholesale prices, but according
90. 563 N.W.2d 472 (Wis. 1997).
91. 551 N.W.2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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to the contract, the art prints were the property of Northwoods. The agreement
would automatically renew unless either party provided written termination six
months before the contract ended. Zoellick notified Northwoods in writing a
full year in advance that he was terminating the contract for the following
year. Six months later Northwoods sold the artwork to a third party. Zoellick
sued to recover royalties, but the complaint was dismissed because the trial
court found that there was not a "meeting of the minds" as to what would
happen with the remaining inventory once a party terminated the contract.
Zoellick appealed the decision.
The court of appeals noted that the contract was ambiguous as to what
would occur with royalties when one party terminated the contract. Because
the trial court found there was no meeting of the minds and the trial court's
decision was not clearly erroneous, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
3. Constitutional Law
The largest body of Wisconsin case law involving art, publishing, and
performance is in the area of constitutional law. Some of these cases concern
the right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment; 9 however, the majority of
the cases involve freedom of expression rights under the First Amendment. 93
A. Right of Privacy
In many instances, the right to privacy conflicts with a newspaper's free
speech rights because newspapers tend to report on subjects that are of
concern to the public. The right to privacy would prevent information from
being published in a newspaper because it would prevent newspapers from
making certain information public knowledge. However, the courts are not
willing to restrict the press when it is an issue of public interest.
United States v. Peters94
In a highly publicized criminal trial, the judge did not close voir dire to the
public and the press. The Milwaukee Sentinel then published information
about the first day of voir dire; however, names and background information
about the prospective jurors were not reported. After the article was published,
the defendants moved to close voir dire, and the court granted the defense's
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94. 754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985).
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motion and cleared the media and the public. There was also an order to
prevent a reporter from gaining access to the trial exhibits. The newspapers
and reporter appealed.
The court noted that because the case involved a factual controversy
that was "capable of repetition, yet evading review," the issue was not moot
even though voir dire had concluded. Relying on a Supreme Court decision,
the court decided the public and the press have a right to attend criminal trials,
which includes a right to attend voir dire. The court noted that a standard must
be met for closure, which included considering other alternatives, identifying
the interest requiring closure, and narrowly structuring the closure so that the
interest was protected, and that standard was not met. As to the second order,
the judge abused his discretion when he prevented only one specific reporter
from gaining access to the exhibits. Therefore, the court vacated both orders
made by the trial judge.
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Sch. Bd.95
A Memorandum of Understanding was drafted from the settlement of a
lawsuit where the superintendent of a school district was suing the district and
school board. The Memorandum of Understanding, including the settlement
terms, was published in the Journal Sentinel's newspapers. The school board
sued, claiming it was protected from disclosure, but the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Journal Sentinel. The school board
appealed.
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the court of appeals found that the
school board was defined as an "authority," and under Wisconsin statutes 96 its
records are public records by law. Therefore, the newspaper had the right to
publish the settlement terms. The court further held that the memorandum was
not considered a "draft," and consequently would not be excluded from being
a public record. The school board claimed that a balancing of interests would
favor keeping the memorandum private because keeping settlements
confidential would shield the school board from public scrutiny. However, the
court disagreed and found that attorney-client privilege did not apply. The
court held that the public interest in inspection outweighed the promise of
confidentiality.
95. 521 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
96. WIs. STAT. §§ 19.31-.37 (2006).
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B. Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment allows freedom of expression in art, publishing, and
artistic performance. However, freedom of expression does not apply to
indecent forms of art. Application of the First Amendment rights to this
industry can be controversial because people have differing views about what
qualifies as art and what constitutes decency.
Wisconsin courts have had to answer several questions regarding First
Amendment rights. First, the courts have had to decide whether music can be
played in public places, or whether performances can be held at malls against
the wishes of mall management. Second, courts have had to address whether
decency ordinances violate the First Amendment. The key issue in these
ordinances that restrict First Amendment rights is that they cannot be vague or
overbroad, otherwise the ordinance will be struck down as unconstitutional.
Kois v. Breier97
Kois was the editor and publisher of Kaleidoscope, a newspaper sold and
distributed in Wisconsin. Brier, the Chief of Police in Milwaukee, and
McCann, the District Attorney, threatened to prosecute Kois for violating
obscenity statutes. Kois requested declaratory and injunctive relief against the
defendants to prevent them from enforcing the statute and interfering with his
newspaper. Kois requested a three judge court resolve the issue because of
constitutional implications; however, Kois had the constitutional challenge
from his complaint removed.
The court held that because Kois dropped the constitutional challenge
from his complaint, the issue no longer needed a three judge court. The court
held that, although there were aspects of the publication that would fit into the
category of obscene, the dominant theme of the publication was political and
social commentary, and the majority of the publication was not for a "prurient
interest in sex." Therefore, the court granted a declaratory judgment stating
the publication was not obscene as a matter of law. Because there was no bad
faith in the threat of prosecution and the defendants were expected to follow
the holding of the case, the court denied the motion for an injunction
restraining the defendants from prosecuting Kois under the obscenity statutes.
However, if the defendants would have continued to threaten prosecution the
plaintiff could have received equitable relief.
97. 312 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
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Oestreich v. Hale98
Oestreich was working at Karmel Korn in Manitowoc, which sold various
newspapers and magazines. A Manitowoc police officer entered Karmel Korn
and bought three magazines, and then informed Oestreich he was violating an
ordinance of the municipal code that prohibited the sale of obscene materials.
Oestreich filed a motion for declaratory judgment to declare that the ordinance
was unconstitutional on its face because it was vague and overbroad.
The court held that by using the words "demoralizing" and "immoral"
the ordinance was vague, as was the phrase "indecent representation . . .
tending to the corruption of morals." The court found that because the words
were not defined anywhere in the ordinance, there was a danger of chilling
constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. Therefore, the court held the
ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it was vague and
overbroad.
Saxe v. Brennan99
Saxe owned and operated an art studio that allowed patrons to paint and/or
sketch nude models provided by Saxe. Milwaukee passed an ordinance
prohibiting "body studios," and Saxe voluntarily closed down for fear of
prosecution; however, he filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance.
Although Saxe "voluntarily" closed down his business, the court found
that he still suffered irreparable harm because he was complying with the
statute that prohibited his business. The court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it included activities that did
not qualify as obscene. For that reason, the court granted the preliminary
injunction.
City of Milwaukee v. Ziegman'00
Ziegman had a tavern in the City of Milwaukee and was convicted twice
of allowing an entertainer to perform obscene acts. Ziegman appealed the
convictions, arguing that the ordinance he was convicted under was a violation
of the First Amendment. The court upheld the convictions because Ziegman
could not show the ordinance was invalid beyond a reasonable doubt, because
there was a reasonable basis for the ordinance, and because there is case law
98. 321 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
99. 416 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
100. 306 N.W.2d 308 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
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from the Supreme Court supporting the ordinance.
Jacobs v. Major'01
Richard and David Jacobs owned the two large shopping malls in
Madison. The malls had a policy of not allowing political or religious
activities, leafleting, handbilling, or soliciting shoppers on mall premises. The
group Nu Parable, which was formed by Major, attempted to get permission
from the mall manager to hold a performance to protest nuclear war at the
malls. When the mall manager refused, the group began hand delivering letters
to the mall tenants to get support from the merchants association to perform.
Jacobs sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the group from entering
the malls. The group then filed a counterclaim based upon the mall restricting
its freedom of speech. A temporary injunction was granted to Jacobs, but the
group violated the order by entering the property and performing. The trial
court then granted a permanent injunction preventing the group from
performing on the property, but denying the request for damages. Jacobs
appealed to broaden the scope of the injunction to include other activities and
to appeal the decision denying damages. The court of appeals found that
because there was no state action, there was no constitutionally protected
freedom of speech, and it affirmed the lower court's decision. The court also
affirmed the scope of the injunction and held that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion by not considering damages.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered whether the Wisconsin
Constitution would require the mall owners to allow others to use their
property to exercise their own free speech rights, against the owners' wishes.
The court affirmed the court of appeals's decision that there was no right of
free speech because there was no state action. There was no state action
because although the mall was open to the public, it was private property. It
could not be considered "essentially a public function" because malls are for
the profit of the owners of the business and property, not for the benefit of the
public. The court affirmed that the group had no right to perform at the malls.
The court then noted that because it was private property, the group was
trespassing. Therefore, the court modified the court of appeals's decision, and
held that the lower court abused its discretion by not considering whether
damages were appropriate.
101. 390 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), affd in part, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987).
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City of Madison v. Baumann10 2
Two musicians received citations for violating anti-noise ordinances by
playing musical instruments late at night in a park. The police received a call
from a person living sixty-six feet away who could not sleep. The call was not
an isolated incident; the police were called between fifteen and thirty times a
month complaining about noise from the park. The musicians argued it was
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. A circuit judge
dismissed the complaints because the court held the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it was overbroad and vague. The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision that the ordinance was overly broad.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that a municipality could enact
ordinances that limited free speech for a legitimate government interest, which
in this case was maintaining the peace and quite of the area. The court
reversed the lower courts, holding that the ordinance was not overly broad or
vague because it applied only to noise that would unreasonably disturb the
peace. The court found that including a "reasonableness standard" did not
make the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
Tee & Bee, Inc. v. City of West Allis103
The West Allis Common Council created an ordinance regulating the
adult bookstore industry and the permitted location for that type of business.
After the ordinance was passed, Tee & Bee opened Super Video and Variety,
which sold sexually explicit materials. The store did not fall within the
ordinance's definition of an adult bookstore because there was no place in the
establishment to show films or movies or to have live performances. The
Council then changed the definition of adult bookstore in the ordinance so that
Super Video and Variety would fall into the category of an adult bookstore.
Tee & Bee sought a permanent injunction to prevent the city from enforcing
the ordinance, but then Tee & Bee applied for a license to have an adult
bookstore. The Council denied the request, and Tee & Bee restructured the
business so that it would no longer be considered an adult business. The city
sought summary judgment.
The court first noted that there was no genuine issue of material fact, so
summary judgment would be appropriate. The court then held that even
though Tee & Bee changed its business, it still had standing because if Tee &
Bee were to prevail, it would return the business to its original state. The court
102. 455 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 470 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1991).
103. 936 F. Supp. 1479 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
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then considered the constitutionality of the ordinance. The court held that the
ordinance was constitutional. The court reasoned that the city met a four-part
test that would allow it to regulate activities that were otherwise protected by
the First Amendment. The four prongs of the test were: "(1) the intended
activity lies within the governmental body's sphere of regulatory power; (2)
the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
the governmental interest is unrelated to suppressing the content of the
regulated material; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that
interest." 104
4. Intellectual Property Law
With the amount of value attached to intellectual property rights, it is
not surprising that there has been a significant amount of case law surrounding
intellectual property. All artists, publishers, and performers derive value from
intellectual property rights. Wisconsin has seen cases in this area involving
copyrights and trademarks.
A. Copyright Law
Copyright law provides an important protection to all artists,
performers and publishers. The value of one's work is minimized if it can be
reproduced. Therefore, copyright owners use their rights to prevent others
from copying their work for profit. There can also be an issue as to who owns
and controls the copyright when it is either a joint effort or a work for hire.
Gaiman v. McFarlane'0 5
Gaiman and McFarlane were both involved with the production of
comic books. Both wrote scripts for comic books, and McFarlane also
illustrated and published comic books. McFarlane published the comic book
Spawn that was initially criticized for bad writing. McFarlane then invited
Gaiman and three others to each write a script for the book. There was no
conversation between the two about copyrights.
The new script written by Gaiman contained three new characters that
Gaiman named, described, and wrote a script for, but who were drawn by
McFarlane. One of the characters was later featured in a "mini-series" that
Gaiman wrote. Gaiman was paid for his work and also received royalties.
104. Id. at 1485.
105. 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
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When Gaiman became aware that McFarlane was looking to sell his
enterprise, Gaiman attempted to secure, in writing, the joint copyrights of the
three characters. McFarlane received copyrights for the books and characters.
Gaiman believed he had joint ownership in the three characters he created.
The district court held that Gaiman was co-owner of the characters and
awarded Gaiman monetary relief.
McFarlane claimed that the statute of limitations had passed because it
began to run when the comic books were published. However, the court held
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Gaiman realized his
rights were being violated, which was five years after the publication of the
books. McFarlane further claimed that the characters were not copyrightable
because the nature of the characters was commonplace. The court disagreed
and found that the characters were sufficiently distinctive and copyrightable
once they were drawn and named. Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision.
B. Trademark Law
Trademarks are also important to artists, publishers, and performers
because a trademark identifies the producer of the work. Trademark infringers
will attempt to benefit from the reputation and good name of the trademark
holder. Similar to any case involving trademark infringement, courts are
concerned with the likelihood of confusion in art, publishing, and performance
cases.
Madison Reprographics v. Cook's Reprographics10 6
Madison Reprographics reproduced documents and photographs for
various businesses, and it used and registered the name "Madison Repro" for
advertisements. Cook's Reprographics was a similar business with similar
clients and used the name "Repro Plus." Madison Reprographics brought a
claim for common law trade name infringement and statutory trademark
infringement. The trial court dismissed the claim because Madison was
unable to show a likelihood of confusion.
The court noted that a descriptive name could be protected under the
common law only if there was evidence of secondary meaning, and generic
terms could never be protected as a trade name. Because the trial court was
considering the claim that the name acquired secondary meaning, the court
implied that "Madison Repro" was descriptive, but found it had not acquired
106. 552 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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secondary meaning. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held that
the term was generic, not descriptive. The trial court did not find there was
enough actual evidence of a likelihood of confusion. The court of appeals
affirmed because there was only sparse evidence of actual confusion. The
court also found that the marks were not identical or similar enough for them
to be indistinguishable. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss
Madison Reprographics' claim.
Patterson v. World Wrestling Entm 't, Inc. 107
Patterson began by promoting and conducting wrestling shows in
Milwaukee and surrounding areas under the names "United Wrestling
Association," "U.W.A .... "Super Star Wresting," and "Superstars of
Wresting." He also used the marks "World Wresting Association" and
"WWA" to promote wresting matches. Patterson sent a letter to Vincent
McMahon and the predecessor to the Good Humor Corporation to demand that
they stop using any similar marks. Later, Patterson sent a letter to the
companies offering to sell the trade names. The matter resulted in trademark
litigation between the two parties; however, it was terminated by consent
decree. Patterson claimed that World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (WWE)
and the Good Humor Corporation, as the WWE's licensee, infringed on his
marks. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and claimed the
defenses of res judicata, judicial estoppel, and laches.
The court first analyzed the res judicata claim, which prevents a party
from being taken to court multiple times for the same cause of action. The
court held that there was no complete identity between the dispute that
occurred over ten years prior and the current infringement claim, and
therefore, res judicata was not an available defense. The court then analyzed
the judicial estoppel claim and determined that there was a material issue of
fact as to whether Patterson's current position was inconsistent with his
previous position. Because Patterson sent the letter early on in the dispute and
waited eighteen years before filing this claim, the defense of laches barred the
infringement claims for "WWF," "World Wrestling Federation," and WWF
Superstars." The defendants were unable to show the continuity of
commercial impression, and so the court rejected the summary judgment based
on the tacking theory. The court then found that Patterson was able to show
bona fide use of the "WWA" and "World Wresting Association" marks.
Finally, the court considered whether there was a likelihood of confusion.
After considering the seven factors in a likelihood of confusion test, the court
107. No. 03-C-0374, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7453 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 31, 2006)
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determined that there was not a likelihood of confusion, and the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment on those grounds.
C. Trade Secret
Another aspect of intellectual property law involves trade secrets.
Sometimes in business, maintaining the secrecy of certain information is very
important, and as such, the information can be considered a trade secret. In
the entertainment industry, client lists can be trade secrets because they are a
vital aspect of business. However, in order to be protected as a trade secret the
information cannot be readily accessible to the public.
Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas10 8
Van Zeeland ran a talent booking agency, and Sandas was a former
employee who had no previous experience in talent booking except for being a
former musician. Prior to leaving and starting a competing business, Sandas
copied Van Zeeland's customer list. The customer list was used by Van
Zeeland to ensure Christmas cards were sent out. Van Zeeland claimed the
customer list was a trade secret and filed a suit to enjoin Sandas from
continuing to use the list. Sandas filed a motion for summary judgment, and
the trial judge held summary judgment was appropriate because the list was
not a trade secret. Van Zeeland appealed and requested that if the list was
found not to be a trade secret then there was misappropriation of Van
Zeeland's time and effort because the list was taken.
The court noted that customer lists could be protected as trade secrets;
however, generally lists are not protected. To determine whether it should be
a trade secret, the court considered a balancing interests test. The court found
that because the list contained names and not addresses, the information was
readily known outside of Van Zeeland's business. The list had only transitory
value, and even though there was a clause in the contract stating that the
customer lists are valuable and unique to the business, the court found that
there could be no equitable estoppel because that would make the clause an
unreasonable restraint on trade. Finally, the court held that the
misappropriation doctrine would not apply to taking the customer list.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the summary judgment.
VII. ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES
A significant number of Wisconsin's legal disputes involving the
108. 267 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1978).
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entertainment industry revolve around entertainment facilities. These disputes
have dealt with many legal issues, including tort, contract, and tax. However,
the vast majority of entertainment facility litigation in Wisconsin has involved
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 0 9
1. Tort Law
Like any other public place, entertainment facilities carry inherent tort
liability risks. Individuals injured on the premises of an entertainment facility
will always have the potential to sue the owner/operator of the facility. The
lone Wisconsin tort case involving an entertainment facility is founded on an
allegation of common law negligence and an alleged violation of Wisconsin's
safe-place statute. 110
Wisconsin's safe-place statute requires employers to keep a place of
employment as safe as the nature of the premises reasonably permits."'
Owners and operators of facilities are not liable for an unsafe condition unless
they have actual or constructive notice of the condition." 2 Constructive notice
exists when the unsafe condition existed for a sufficient length of time,
whereby the owner should have discovered and fixed the unsafe condition." 3
Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc. 114
Nancy Megal slipped on a ketchup-soaked french fry while walking down
a stairway, as she was exiting the Brown County Veterans Memorial Arena
following an ice show at the arena. Because of the slip, Megal fractured her
left ankle. Megal sued the arena, alleging common law negligence and a
violation of Wisconsin's safe-place statute. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the arena with respect to both claims.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that
Megal's claim did not support a safe-place statute violation. Megal could not
prove the arena had actual notice of the french fry. She also could not prove
how long the fry had been on the stairs. Without proof of how long an unsafe
condition had existed, the defendant usually could not be assigned constructive
notice of the condition. However, an exception to the general constructive
notice rule exists. This exception allows for assignment of constructive notice
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110. WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2006).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 672 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd in part, 682 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2004).
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when there is "a reasonable probability that an unsafe condition will occur
because of the nature of the business and the manner in which it is
conducted."' 1 5 The court refused to apply the exception because the exception
was intended for only a narrow set of circumstances where the unsafe
condition is created by debris falling in the immediate area of where it came
from. The french fry was located far from where it was purchased, making it
less reasonable for the arena employees to notice the condition. The court
determined that application of the exception in this case would be
unreasonable because of the size of the venue. The court found that
application of the exception in this type of situation would allow the exception
to swallow the rule.
The court of appeals also determined that summary judgment dismissal
of the common law negligence claim was appropriate because "a negligence
claim cannot be maintained when a safe-place violation cannot be
established."1 16
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals's
decision that Megal could not support a claim for violation of the safe-place
statute. However, the court reversed the portion of the lower court decision
pertaining to Megal's common law negligence claim. The court found that
Megal could show that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care, and
therefore, she could proceed with her negligence claim.
2. Contract Law
Contract law is another area that can have a significant impact on owners
and operators of entertainment facilities. It is necessary for owners and
operators of entertainment facilities to have contractual relationships with
numerous parties, including entertainers and vendors. The only Wisconsin
entertainment facility case involving contract law, focused on defining the
place of employment. Wisconsin statute section 101.01117 states, "place of
employment, shall mean and include every place, whether indoors or out or
underground and the premises appurtenant thereto where either temporarily or
permanently any industry, trade or business is carried on, or where any process
or operation, directly or indirectly related to any industry, trade or business, is
carried on, and where any person is, directly or indirectly, employed by
another for direct or indirect gain or profit."'" 8
115. Id. at 108 (citing Strack v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. 150 N.W.2d 361, 364 (Wis. 1967)).
116. Id. at 111.
117. WIS. STAT. § 101.01 (2006).
118. Mennetti v. W. Side Businessmen's Ass'n, 18 N.W.2d 487 (Wis. 1945) (quoting WIS. STAT.
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Mennetti v. W. Side Businessmen's Ass 'n119
The defendant, West Side Businessmen's Association, entered into a
contract with Ben Bergor for Bergor to provide entertainment during the
defendant's Victory Harvest Fair. The plaintiff, Eddie Mennetti, was hired by
Bergor to perform a comedy act during the fair. The defendants provided a
platform for the plaintiff to perform his act. The platform was not satisfactory
for the plaintiffs purposes, but he used it anyway. During one of his
performances, the plaintiff was injured when the platform suddenly lurched
and he fell.
The trial court gave the jury instructions that defined the plaintiff as the
"frequenter" and the platform as his "place of employment." The court also
instructed the jury that the defendant was the owner of the platform. The jury
found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff $7371.67 in damages.
The defendant then appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The defendant claimed that the platform was not the plaintiffs place of
employment. However, the court disagreed and held that the platform was the
plaintiff s place of employment under Wisconsin Statute section 101.01 (1).20
The court found that even if the plaintiff is classified as an independent
contractor, instead of an employee, he is still protected as a frequenter. The
court affirmed the trial court decision because the defendant owned and
controlled the platform, it was liable to the plaintiff for his injuries.
The defendant also claimed assumption of risk as a defense, but the court
did not accept this defense because this defense is not available under the
"safe-place statute."
3. Tax Law
As in any other industry, the entertainment industry has various tax issues
that can lead to legal battles. There have been a handful of cases in Wisconsin
involving the intersection of tax law, particularly the Internal Revenue Code,
and entertainment facilities.
Avalon Amusement Corp. v. United States 21
The plaintiff operated a public dance hall where patrons paid an
admission fee to come and dance. The plaintiff also offered checkroom
§ 101.01(1)(1945)).
119. 18N.W.2d487.
120. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(1) (2006).
121. 165 F.2d 653 (7thCir. 1948).
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service for a separate charge. The plaintiff was taxed as a "roof garden,
cabaret, or other similar place furnishing a public performance for profit"
under section 1700(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. 122 The plaintiff paid
the tax but sued to recover a portion of what he paid. The plaintiff argued that
operation of the dance hall did not qualify under this section of the code
because it was not a "public performance for profit."
The district court determined that the tax was proper and decided in
favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the
district court. The court held that because the music for dancing was available
to anyone who paid the admission fee, it did qualify as a public performance
for profit and thus fit under section 1700(e)(1). Since the dance hall was a
public performance for profit, the tax on the checkroom receipts was proper.
Kern v. United States 23
The plaintiff taxpayer brought a claim seeking a tax refund of $609.94.
The United States filed a counterclaim for $65,831.03 in additional taxes. The
plaintiff claimed that he was improperly taxed under the cabaret excise tax
because the barroom was completely separate from the dance room in his
establishment.
The plaintiff filed for summary judgment, which was granted by the court.
The court held that under this tax, Congress intended a unity between the
service of refreshments and the entertainment at the facility. The court found
that this unity was absent at the plaintiffs establishment because a person
could not see the dance room from the bar. The only door between the two
rooms was for emergency use only, and therefore, was almost always closed.
Schmidt v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm 'n124
The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) determined that
Anthony Schmidt was liable for unemployment compensation tax for several
exotic dancers who worked in his tavern. The Commission determined that
the dancers qualified as Schmidt's employees, and therefore, he had to pay the
tax. Schmidt sued, alleging that the dancers did not qualify as his employees
under Wisconsin Statute section 108.02(12)(a). 125 The trial court agreed and
reversed the Commission's ruling. The Commission appealed, and the court
of appeals reversed the trial courts ruling, holding that the dancers were
122. I.R.C. § 1700(e)(1) (1939).
123. 264 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
124. 451 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
125. WIS. STAT. § 108.02(12)(a) (2006).
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employees and Schmidt was liable to pay the tax.
The dancers were presumptively Schmidt's employees under section
108.02(12)(a), which states that "employee means any individual who is or has
been performing services for pay for an employing unit."' 26 Schmidt argued
that he could rebut the presumption because he could show that the dancers
were free of his "control and direction." The court disagreed, holding that the
dancers were subject to his control and direction. Schmidt had a set of rules
the dancers were required to follow and he would intervene if he believed that
dancer's performance was obscene.
TMI, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm 'n 127
The LIRC held that the plaintiff, TMI, was liable for unemployment
compensation taxes for exotic dancers who performed at a tavern owned by
TMI. The LIRC determined that the dancers were employees under
Wisconsin Statute section 108.02(12).128 TMI sued and the trial court reversed
LIRC's finding. LIRC then appealed and the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's ruling.
The court of appeals held that LIRC had credible and ample evidence to
support its determination. The dancers did provide their own costumes, music,
and routines. They also determined the length of their sets. However, TMI
provided the stage, lighting, sound equipment, and the dance licenses. TMI
also restricted the dancer's conduct, so that the dancers would not do anything
that might jeopardize TMI's licenses. The court determined that TMI had
substantial control over the dancers to satisfy the presumption that they were
employees of TMI. TMI did not show enough evidence to rebut the
presumption that the dancers were employees of TMI.
4. Constitutional Law
The area of law that has seen the most litigation involving Wisconsin
entertainment facilities is constitutional law. These cases have primarily dealt
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, with most of the cases based on
First Amendment challenges.
The plaintiffs in the constitutional challenges were usually persons who
had been restricted in their ability to operate their business by a local
ordinance or state statute. The ordinances or laws often prohibited or
126 WIS. STAT. § 108.02(12)(a) (2006).
127. 558 N.W.2d 706 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
128. WIS. STAT. § 108.02(12).
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restricted the adult entertainment facilities the plaintiffs wished to operate.
Plaintiffs brought constitutional claims, alleging that the ordinances and
statutes violate their right to free speech, due process, and equal protection.
A. Freedom of Expression
There has been a large amount of litigation in Wisconsin dealing with
entertainment facilities and First Amendment rights. The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution states "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."' 2 9 Some plaintiffs have also claimed that the law in question
violates his or her free speech rights under the Wisconsin Constitution. The
Wisconsin Constitution says, "[e]very person may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press."' 130
The first case in this area was decided in 1937, and the most recent was
decided last year in 2006. However, a majority of the cases have been
litigated within the last twenty years. The cases have come before Wisconsin
state and federal courts.
Stetzer v. Chippewa County'3'
The plaintiff, the owner of a tavern, challenged a county ordinance that
restricted the hours of operation for dances halls. The plaintiffs tavern
featured a dance floor and a three-piece orchestra. The plaintiffs business
would have been harmed by the ordinance, particularly on Sundays because
the ordinance prohibited dancing on Sundays at dance halls. The plaintiff
contended that the ordinance did not apply to his business and that the
ordinance was unconstitutional because it was the result of improper
delegation of legislative power to a county board.
The circuit court held the ordinance was valid and granted the county's
motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the
circuit court's decision. The court found that public dances and dance halls
were proper subjects of the county board's police power, and therefore, there
was no improper delegation of legislative authority. The court also
129. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
131. 273 N.W. 525 (Wis. 1937).
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
determined that the ordinance applied to the plaintiff s establishment.
Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff132
The plaintiff owned a tavern that featured nude and semi-nude
entertainment. In September 1972, town officials revoked the plaintiffs
liquor license for operating "an indecent house by presenting performances of
lewd, obscene and indecent matter."'3 3 The plaintiff sued for injunctive relief,
estopping the revocation of its liquor license. The plaintiff claimed the town
officials misapplied the standards of obscenity in the statute in determining
that the tavern was an "indecent house." The plaintiff also contended that the
revocation of the liquor license was an action that was entitled to judicial
review because the revocation was done to prevent nude and semi-nude
dancing, which was arguably protected by the First Amendment.
The court held that the plaintiff did not show he had a reasonably good
chance of success on the merits because it did not appear that the town
officials misapplied the standard. However, the court granted the plaintiffs
temporary injunction and ordered the liquor license reinstated until a proper
hearing could have been convened. The court found the plaintiff had shown
irreparable harm. The court reasoned that irreparable harm existed because
the purpose of the liquor license revocation was to terminate a First
Amendment right. The court decided that the town officials could not revoke
the liquor license without an appropriate hearing.
Little v. City of Greenfield134
The plaintiffs wanted to open a business featuring nude dancing, but they
were unable to obtain the proper permit from the city. After learning about the
plaintiffs' intention to open the nude dancing business, the city amended its
ordinance to require a special use permit to operate a nude dancing business.
The city then denied the plaintiffs' application for a special use permit. The
plaintiffs then sued the city and its officials claiming the city's actions violated
their constitutional rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court
held that the city's amendment to the ordinance was targeted at suppressing
nude dancing, which is a constitutionally protected form of expression. The
court also found that the special use permit was content-based discrimination
132. 354 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
133. Id. at 1122.
134. 575 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
[Vol. 17:2
ENTERTAINMENT LA WIN WISCONSIN
that violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted the preliminary
injunction because the plaintiffs were possibly going to suffer irreparable
harm.
Suburban Video, Inc. v. City of Delafieldl3 5
Superb Video was an adult oriented business that specialized in selling
adult movies, books, and magazines. Superb Video sued the City of Delafield,
seeking injunctive relief from an ordinance that regulated "adult oriented
businesses." Superb claimed the ordinance violated the First, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
The court denied most of Superb's claim; however, the court found that
portions of the ordinance's licensing system violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court enjoined the city from enforcing the portions of the
licensing scheme deemed unconstitutional. The court held that requiring
background checks for shareholders, officers, and employees of adult oriented
businesses was unconstitutional because this requirement did not help serve
the ordinance's stated purpose of protecting public health, welfare, and safety.
The court severed the ordinance and upheld the remainder of the ordinance.
Libra Books, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee136
The plaintiff, Libra Books, sued the city claiming an ordinance was in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The ordinance regulated
the structure of movie booths where customers could watch pornographic
videos. The plaintiff had eighteen of the booths in its bookstore. The
ordinance required that the booths have at least one side completely open to
the public. The plaintiff's booths had three solid walls and a swinging door on
the fourth side.
The plaintiff contended that the ordinance infringed on its freedom of
expression. The court disagreed and granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the ordinance properly served the
legitimate government interests of controlling communicable diseases and
maintaining sanitary conditions in public places. The court also found that the
ordinance was narrowly tailored to satisfy its objectives and was not
overbroad.
135. 694 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
136. 818 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
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Fond du Lac County v. Mentze1137
Donald Mentzel, the owner of an exotic nightclub, was found guilty of
violating an ordinance that required liquor license holders to obtain a cabaret
permit before providing any form of dance entertainment. The ordinance also
prohibited nude dancing and required dancers to wear a minimal amount of
clothing. Mentzel was cited for violating the ordinance on three occasions.
Mentzel appealed the trial court's conviction claiming the county's
regulation of dance entertainment was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
The court of appeals agreed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it prohibited nude expression that was not associated with
harmful secondary effects. The court found that there were types of nude
expression unrelated to the harmful secondary effects of some nude dancing.
Mentzel also claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection clause. He claimed it was in violation of equal
protection because the county ordinance did not prohibit nude dancing in the
cities within the county. The court held that the ordinance did not violate the
equal protection clause of the constitution. The court found that the
discrepancies in regulation are a natural part of systematic zoning where each
city has its own governing authority that holds police power.
Matney v. County ofKenosha1 38
The plaintiffs, Phil Matney and Satellite News and Video, Inc., owned
and operated an adult bookstore in Kenosha County. The plaintiffs sued the
county, challenging a Kenosha County Board of Health Regulation. The
regulation required at least one open side on booths in adult video stores where
sexually explicit videos were viewed. The plaintiffs alleged that the regulation
violated their free speech rights under the First Amendment and the Wisconsin
Constitution. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, while the county moved
for summary judgment.
In granting the county's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the regulation was constitutional. The county enacted the
regulation to prevent the spread of diseases, namely sexually transmitted
diseases. The court found that preventing the spread of disease was a
legitimate government objective and that the regulation served this objective.
The court also determined that the purpose of the regulation was to prevent the
spread of diseases, not to restrict free speech.
137. 536 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
138. 887 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Wis. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 1996).
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision. The court of
appeals agreed that the regulation served legitimate health and safety concerns
and did not control the content of the films or the customers' ability to view
the films. The court also found that the plaintiffs had no constitutional right to
privately view the films in a public establishment.
DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie139
The plaintiff corporation owned and operated an adult bookstore. Upon
learning of the plaintiffs intention to operate the adult store within town
limits, the town responded by enacting an ordinance restricting the hours an
"adult establishment" may operate. The plaintiff filed an action alleging that
the ordinance violated the plaintiffs First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. The court granted the town's motion for summary judgment.
Although, the court denied the town's motion for attorney's fees and costs.
The court held that the ordinance was constitutional because it
reasonably furthered its stated goals. The town argued that the ordinance was
intended to prevent crime. The court accepted that the ordinance furthered the
interest of preventing crime. The ordinance was narrowly tailored to prohibit
adult establishments from being open during the hours when crime is most
likely to occur and when law enforcement is least capable of preventing it.
The court also found that adult establishments were left ample time to be open
for operation.
Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. v. Town of Trenton140
The Town of Trenton had an existing ordinance that prohibited public
nudity in establishments possessing a liquor license. Shortly after receiving a
liquor license, Lounge Management decided to offer nude dancing and sued
the town seeking injunctive relief banning the town from enforcing the
ordinance. Lounge Management contended that the ordinance was in violation
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.14 1  The circuit court upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance and then the court of appeals certified the
question for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the circuit court and found
the ordinance was unconstitutional. The court held that the ordinance was
overbroad because it restricted all forms of nudity in any establishment with a
139. 60 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
140. 580 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1998).
141. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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liquor license. The court also refused to sever the ordinance and uphold the
portions it deemed constitutional.
Schultz v. City of Cumberland142
Joseph Schultz, the owner of the Island Bar, and Tonya Norwood, an
Island Bar exotic dancer, sued the City of Cumberland challenging the city's
"sexually oriented business" ordinance. The Island Bar was a bar that featured
nude female dancers. The city enacted its sexually oriented business
ordinance after law enforcement officials discovered that prostitution and
other contact between dancers and patrons had occurred at the bar.
The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for an injunction that
restricted the city from enforcing the sexually oriented business ordinance.
The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
restricted more free speech than was necessary to meet its goals. The court
also found that the overbroad portion of the ordinance could not be severed
from the parts of the ordinance that were constitutional.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court by
upholding the portion of the statute restricting the hours of operation for
sexually oriented businesses. The court determined that this restriction was
reasonable. However, the court affirmed the district court finding that the
ordinance unconstitutionally restricted free expression. The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that the ordinance went too far in how it
regulated adult entertainment.
Town of Lyndon v. Beyer 143
Beyer operated an establishment called "Cruisin" that served alcohol
and offered nude dancing entertainment. Shortly after Beyer received a liquor
license, the town adopted an ordinance prohibiting nude dancing in
establishments holding liquor licenses. Following the adoption of the
ordinance, Beyer made a change, requiring his dancers to wear minimal
clothing. Despite the change, the town sued Beyer, alleging that Beyer
violated the ordinance. Beyer filed a counterclaim, claiming the ordinance
violated the First Amendment.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the town and Beyer
appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The court
142. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd in part, 228 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2000).
143. 627 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
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found that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was overbroad. The
ordinance was intended to eliminate the negative secondary effects of nude
dancing. However, the ordinance regulated activity that was not reasonably
connected to the negative secondary effects, and thus, the ordinance was
overbroad. The court refused to sever the ordinance because it determined the
ordinance needed to be rewritten.
Wil-Kar, Inc. v. Viii. of Germantown144
The plaintiff, Video Update, was a store that sold and rented videos.
Approximately two percent of the Video Update's videos were adult oriented.
Video Update maintained a separate section of the store for its adult videos.
Video Update's adult section was closed in January 2001 when a police officer
inspected the store and discovered that Video Update did not have an adult
oriented business license, which was in violation of a village ordinance.
Video Update sued the village, claiming the ordinance violated the First
Amendment.
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. In
granting the plaintiffs motion, the court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad. The court found the ordinance overbroad
because it did not properly serve the governmental interest of regulating the
negative secondary effects of adult entertainment. The court also noted that
stores, like Video Update, which deal with a limited amount of adult material,
usually do not cause negative secondary effects.
The court also held that the ordinance violated the prior restraint
doctrine. The court found that the village board had virtually unlimited power
to impose conditions on establishments applying for an adult oriented business
license. The court determined that the court's power to impose conditions on
applicants operated as censorship that violated the prior restraint doctrine.
Clarkson v. Town of Florence45
Raissa Clarkson, the owner of Golden Nugget Tavern, sued the Town
of Florence alleging that an ordinance enacted by the town was in violation of
the First Amendment. The ordinance prohibited nude dancing at taverns in the
Town of Florence. Golden Nugget Tavern featured dancers who performed
partially nude. Clarkson filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability and a motion for injunctive relief. The town also filed a motion for
144. 153 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
145. 198 F. Supp. 2d 997 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
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summary judgment on the issues of liability and damages.
The court granted Clarkson's motion for summary judgment and denied
the town's motion. The court also denied Clarkson's motion for injunctive
relief. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
overbroad and was not narrowly construed to combat the negative "secondary
effects" of nude dancing. The ordinance applied to a broader range of
expressive activities than was necessary to achieve the goal of combating the
secondary effects. The court applied intermediate scrutiny in its analysis of
the ordinance. The town had repealed the ordinance prior to the action going
to trial; however, the court determined that Clarkson still had standing on the
issues of liability and damages.
In granting Clarkson's motion for summary judgment, the court found
the town liable to Clarkson. The court also held that there was enough
evidence for a reasonable jury to award Clarkson damages for emotional
distress. Clarkson also could recover "presumed" damages without actual
proof of injury because it was a constitutional violation.
Town of Delaven v. Suriano146
Candice Suriano leased property to the Greater Geneva Group, Inc.
where the Greater Geneva Group operated an adult novelty store named
Exotica V. The circuit court enjoined Exotica V from operating its adult
entertainment establishment at its location. The circuit court issued the
injunction because Exotica V was in violation of Walworth County zoning
ordinances. Exotica V violated the zoning ordinances by operating an adult
entertainment establishment within 750 feet of a park. The defendants
appealed the circuit court's decision to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court ruling. The court found
that the town did not have any administrative remedies available, and
therefore, seeking an injunction was proper on the town's part. The court also
held that the Exotica V did not qualify as a legal pre-existing, non-conforming
use under the amended zoning ordinance. The court determined that Exotica
V never qualified as a valid unspecified use under the prior ordinance; and
thus, it did not now qualify a legal pre-existing use.
The defendants also argued that provisions of the prior zoning were
unconstitutional restraints on free speech. The court also rejected this
argument, holding that the prior zoning ordinance was not a licensing
ordinance and did not specifically restrict adult entertainment establishments.
146. 644 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
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Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset147
Ben's Bar, Inc. and two of the erotic dancers who worked at Ben's Bar
sued the Village of Somerset for its enactment of a "Sexually Oriented
Business Ordinance."' 148 The ordinance made it a violation for "any Person to
knowingly and intentionally appear in a state of Nudity in a Sexually Oriented
Business." 149 It also prohibited the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the
premises of a sexually oriented business.
The plaintiffs sought permanent injunctive relief barring enforcement of
the statute. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated their right to free
expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution. 150 The district court denied the
injunction, holding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits.
The court determined that the ordinance passed constitutional muster. After
unsuccessful attempts to settle, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion because the ordinance was
constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment. On appeal, the
plaintiffs challenged only the portion of the ordinance prohibiting
consumption of alcoholic beverages at sexually oriented businesses. They
alleged that this portion of the ordinance was unconstitutional.
The court of appeals held that the portion of the ordinance prohibiting
alcohol consumption was constitutional. The court applied intermediate
scrutiny in its analysis of the ordinance. The court held that the village's
purpose in enacting this portion of the ordinance was legitimate and that the
ordinance served this purpose. The village's purpose in enacting the statute
was to reduce or eliminate the "secondary effects" associated with the
combination of adult entertainment and alcohol consumption.
G.M. Enters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph 151
The plaintiff, operator of a club offering topless dancing, challenged
the constitutionality of two town ordinances. The ordinances prohibited nude
dancing at establishments licensed to sell alcohol. The town enacted the
ordinances because of concern about negative secondary effects linked to
"sexually oriented businesses." The plaintiff filed a claim seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The town filed a motion for summary judgment, which
147. 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003).
148. Village of Somerset, Wis., Ordinance A-472 (Oct. 24, 2000).
149. Id. § 5(a).
150. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
151. 350 F.3d 631 (7thCir. 2003).
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was granted by the district court.
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the ordinances violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the town. The court held the
ordinances were aimed at minimizing the negative secondary effects, not
limiting free speech. The court also found that the ordinances reasonably
promoted the town's interest in minimizing the secondary effects.
Kraimer v. City of Schofield'52
The plaintiffs were owners of a property that they intended to open and
operate as a non-alcoholic adult entertainment facility. The plaintiffs were not
able to open the facility because the city would not give them the proper
permits. The plaintiffs filed suit against the city, alleging that certain
ordinances, which the city relied on in denying the plaintiffs permits, were
unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages
for losses they suffered and filed a motion for summary judgment.
Shortly after the plaintiffs filed suit, the city repealed one of the
ordinances in question. However, the court determined that the plaintiffs'
challenge, related to that ordinance, was not moot because the plaintiffs still
had a claim for damages for the harm done while the ordinance was in place.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment relating to
all of the ordinances except one. The court found that all but one of the
ordinances unconstitutionally violated the plaintiffs' right to freedom of
expression. Regarding the ordinance that the court found to be constitutional,
the court held that the plaintiffs did not show how the ordinance would limit
free speech. The city was enjoined from enforcing the ordinances the court
deemed unconstitutional.
MDK, Inc. v. Village of Grafton153
The plaintiff corporation challenged a village ordinance that it
contended prohibited it from offering erotic dancing at its tavern, claiming that
the ordinance violated its First Amendment right to free expression. The
plaintiff and the defendant both moved for summary judgment. The court had
previously denied the plaintiff s request for a preliminary injunction.
The village claimed it enacted the ordinance to prevent the negative
secondary effects associated with adult entertainment facilities. The village
152. 342 F. Supp. 2d 807 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
153. 345 F. Supp. 2d 952 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
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said the negative secondary effects included "unlawful sexual activity,
sexually transmitted diseases, urban blight, increased crime and reduced
property values." 154
The court granted the plaintiff summary judgment. The court held that
the ordinance went too far in that it regulated establishments that did not
produce the negative secondary effects the village was concerned with. The
court determined that the ordinance was overbroad and restricted more speech
than was necessary to serve the governmental interest.
Eggert Group, LLC v. Town of Harrisonl55
The owner of a club that sold alcohol and offered entertainment,
including nude dancing, sued the town for enacting an ordinance that
prohibited nude dancing in an establishment licensed to sell alcohol. The
plaintiff claimed the ordinance was facially invalid under the First
Amendment. The parties agreed to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The
plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the
magistrate judge.
The magistrate judge held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
because it was overbroad. The town's stated purpose for the ordinance was to
reduce the "negative secondary effects" associated with the combination of
alcohol and nude dancing. The court found that the ordinance extended to
include conduct that did not have the negative secondary effects. In the form
it was enacted, the ordinance would have gone so far as to prohibit nude
dancing at bachelor parties in hotel rooms, if the hotel had a liquor license.
The town was enjoined from enforcing the ordinance.
Schmitty's City Nightmare, LLC v. City of Fond Du Lac1 56
Schmitty's City Nightmare, LLC sued the City of Fond Du Lac
challenging the city's adult oriented business ordinance and its loitering
ordinance. The owners of Schmitty's intended to offer erotic dance
entertainment; however, the owners opted to avoid offering erotic
entertainment because they feared prosecution under the city's adult oriented
business zoning ordinance. Schmitty's also challenged the city's loitering
ordinance because it alleged that police harassed Schmitty's patrons who
congregated outside of the business. Schnitty's alleged that both ordinances
were overbroad and that the adult business ordinance was in violation of the
154. Id. at 955.
155. 372 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
156. 391 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
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First Amendment.
Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that both ordinances
were constitutional. In upholding the loitering ordinance, the court found the
ordinance was not overbroad because it was narrowly construed to prohibit
loitering only in situations where the loitering posed a threat. The court
determined the adult oriented business ordinance was constitutional because it
was not overbroad and it served a legitimate government interest. The court
held that the zoning ordinance did not unreasonably restrain free speech
because it was a zoning ordinance, and therefore, it restricted only certain
activity in certain areas.
Wis. Gifts, Inc. v. City of Oak Creek 57
Wisconsin Gifts, Inc. operated a store named Cupid's Toys, which sold
adult entertainment materials. Wisconsin Gifts sued the City of Oak Creek
after the city amended its zoning and adult entertainment business ordinances.
Wisconsin Gifts claimed the ordinances were unconstitutional and that
Cupid's Toys did not qualify as an adult entertainment business under the
ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment on behalf of the city,
dismissing Wisconsin Gifts' complaint.
The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's ruling. The court of
appeals held that Wisconsin Gifts had not presented sufficient evidence to
show the ordinances were unconstitutional. Wisconsin Gifts also did not
present evidence to dispute the city's need for the ordinances. In addition, the
court found that Wisconsin Gifts did not have the right to challenge the city's
determination that Cupid's Toys was an adult entertainment business.
Wisconsin Gifts could not challenge the determination because it had not
exhausted its administrative remedies with the city, and therefore, the court did
not consider whether Cupid's Toys was an adult entertainment business under
the ordinance.
B. Due Process
There has been one entertainment facility case in Wisconsin dealing with
an alleged violation of due process rights. Due process is guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which states "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
157. No. 2005AP646, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 244 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006).
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without due process of law." 158  The following case involved adult
entertainment.
Manos v. City of Green Bay 59
The plaintiff, Ted Manos, was the owner of a tavern named the Bunny
Hop Inn. On December 1, 1971, Manos was cited for violating a City of
Green Bay ordinance, when police officers witnessed a female dancing topless
in the Bunny Hop Inn. On June 14, 1972, the Green Bay Common Council
refused to grant the plaintiffs application for renewal of his liquor license.
The plaintiff sued the city, contending the refusal to renew his liquor license
violated his due process rights. Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The court granted the defendant's motion.
The court found that the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected
property interest in his liquor license. However, the court held that the
plaintiff must receive procedural due process that satisfied the minimum
standards of due process. The court determined that the city provided
adequate due process because the plaintiff received notice of the hearing and
the charges against him. He was also given an opportunity to present a
defense and confront opposing witnesses.
C. Equal Protection
Wisconsin has also had one equal protection case dealing with
entertainment facilities and adult entertainment. Equal protection is
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment reads, "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 160
Fond du Lac County v. Burnett161
George Burnett was convicted of violating Fond du Lac County's
cabaret license ordinance. Burnett was cited for violating the ordinance when
two police officers came to Burnett's tavern for a routine check. The police
officers found a woman in a bikini dancing on the bar while men placed
money in her garment. The officers also witnessed televisions broadcasting
sexual acts. Burnett violated the cabaret license ordinance because he did not
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
159. 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
161. 476 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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have a cabaret license and the woman was not dancing on a raised platform
separated from patrons by a railing. He also violated it by showing sexually
graphic films, which the ordinance prohibited.
Burnett argued that the ordinance violated his constitutional right to
equal protection because the ordinance only applied to establishments in
unincorporated areas. The trial court denied Burnett's motion to dismiss the
citation and convicted him of the violation. He appealed the conviction, again
claiming the ordinance violated his equal protection rights.
The court of appeals reasoned that the ordinance treated everyone in the
county equally. Those living in incorporated areas where not subject to the
ordinance because their villages or cities had not adopted a similar ordinance,
but the county had treated everyone within its jurisdiction equally. The court
upheld the conviction, holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutional and
did not violated Burnett's equal protection rights.
VIII. NEW TECHNOLOGIES (COMPUTER/INTERNET)
The proliferation of the use of the internet has led to many legal issues
concerning the production and use of materials contained on the World Wide
Web. Although the use of the Internet has proliferated, little litigation has
occurred. While the only cases to this point have focused on tort claims, it is
expected that in the future cases may develop covering claims of copyright or
trademark infringement perhaps as a result of the illegal downloading of
protected copyrights and trademarks. Moreover, in the constitutional law
arena, in 2001, a statute was passed that prevents state-run internet sites from
obtaining personal information about users without the users' consent. 162
1. Tort Law
The available Wisconsin cases dealing with new technology are tort
cases. More specifically, both cases involved allegations of defamation and
unfair competition on the internet. Because the internet is global,
jurisdictional questions often arise in these cases. To be tried in a state court,
the party needs to have enough contact with the specific state such that the
court is satisfied that it has personal jurisdiction over the party. Another
question that arises in these cases relates to how certain statutory definitions,
which are not specifically applicable to new technology, can be applied to new
technology.
162. WIS. STAT. § 19.68 (2006).
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It's in the Cards v. Fuschetto163
Meneau was the owner of It's in the Cards in Wisconsin. Fuschetto
was from New York. The two exchanged messages through SportsNet, an
online forum where sports memorabilia dealers communicated to buy and sell
goods. Eventually, the two men spoke over the phone. Meneau had arranged
a trip to visit Fuschetto, but when Fuschetto and his wife became ill he asked
Meneau to postpone the trip. A dispute arose over the cost of the airline
tickets, and tickets to a Knicks game and the David Letterman Show.
Fuschetto posted the dispute on the bulletin board feature of SportsNet.
Meneau then filed suit for defamation, negligence, and tortious interference
with business relations. The circuit court granted Fuschetto's motion for
summary judgment because it applied the statute for periodicals, 164 which
required Meneau to request a retraction before asking the courts for relief.
The court of appeals noted that the definition of "periodical" in
Webster's Dictionary did not include internet bulletin boards because they are
not published on a regular basis. The court noted that it was the legislature's
responsibility to amend statutes in order to keep pace with technology, and the
court was not willing to expand the definition and the statute to include
bulletin boards. The lower court's judgment was reversed and remanded.
Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C.165
Hy Cite was a Wisconsin-based business selling china, cookware, and
glassware. The Badbussinessbureau.com was a foreign company, which ran a
website where customers could complain about businesses. The complaints
were available for others to see on the internet through the "rip-off report."
The defendant offered an opportunity to post rebuttals or enroll in a program
to resolve consumer complaints, both for a cost. The plaintiff claimed through
the website that the defendant was engaged in unfair competition, false
advertising, and trademark violations. The defendants had limited contact
with Wisconsin, and therefore, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
The court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because the plaintiff failed to meet the constitutional requirements for
jurisdiction; the foreign company did not have minimum contacts with the
state. Applying the same reasons, the court determined that the requirements
163. 535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
164. WIS. STAT. § 895.05(2).
165. 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Wis. 2004).
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for general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction were also not met.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin courts have handled numerous claims involving a variety
of legal issues within the development of the Wisconsin entertainment
industry. This report has attempted to provide an overview of the many ways
in which the courts have had to interpret the legal impact on the entertainment
industry.
The report can serve as a valuable tool for practitioners attempting to
understand the impact of the law on the entertainment industry in the state of
Wisconsin. In the future, claims pertaining to the law's impact on the
entertainment industry will increase as the industry continues to expand and
grow.
